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ABSTRACT 
N-variant Hardware Design 
by 
Yousra Alkabani 
The emergence of lightweight embedded devices imposes stringent constraints on 
the area and power of the circuits used to construct them. Meanwhile, many of 
these embedded devices are used in applications that require diversity and flexibility 
to make them secure and adaptable to the fluctuating workload or variable fabric. 
While field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) provide high flexibility, the use of 
application specific integrated circuits (ASICs) to implement such devices is more 
appealing because ASICs can currently provide an order of magnitude less area and 
better performance in terms of power and speed. My proposed research introduces the 
N-variant hardware design methodology that adds the sufficient flexibility needed by 
such devices while preserving the performance and area advantages of using ASICs. 
The N-variant hardware design embeds different variants of the design control 
part on the same IC to provide diversity and flexibility. Because the control circuitry 
usually represents a small fraction of the whole circuit, using multiple versions of the 
control circuitry is expected to have a low overhead. The objective of my thesis is to 
formulate a method that provides the following advantages: (i) ease of integration in 
the current ASIC design flow, (ii) minimal impact on the performance and area of the 
ASIC design, and (iii) providing a wide range of applications for hardware security 
and tuning the performance of chips either statically (e.g., post-silicon optimization) 
or dynamically (at runtime). This is achieved by adding diversity at two orthogonal 
levels: (i) state space diversity, and (ii) scheduling diversity. State space diversity 
expands the state space of the controller. Using state space diversity, we introduce 
an authentication mechanism and the first active hardware metering schemes. On the 
other hand, scheduling diversity is achieved by embedding different control schedules 
in the same design. The scheduling diversity can be spatial, temporal, or a hybrid 
of both methods. Spatial diversity is achieved by implementing multiple control 
schedules that use various parts of the chip at different rates. Temporal diversity 
provides variants of the controller that can operate at unequal speeds. A hybrid of 
both spatial and temporal diversities can also be implemented. Scheduling diversity 
is used to add the flexibility to tune the performance of the chip. An application 
of the thermal management of the chip is demonstrated using scheduling diversity. 
Experimental results show that the proposed method is easy to integrate in the current 
ASIC flow, has a wide range of applications, and incurs low overhead. 
IV 
Acknow ledgment 
First I would like to thank my advisor Professor Keith Cooper for the incredible sup-
port, help, and advice. I would also like to thank my committee members: Professor 
Moshe Vardi, Professor Kartik Mohanram, and Professor Bart Sinclair for the great 
insights they have given me to improve my work. 
Professor Joe Warren, the chair of the computer science department has provided 
me with great support as a student in the computer science department. 
I would also like to thank all the professors who taught me classes at Rice univer-
sity and at Ain Shams university. I would like to specifically thank Professor Luay 
N akhleh for being a great teacher. 
I would like to thank all the staff in the computer science department. Darnell 
Price has given me great support, and Bel Martinez has patiently helped me finish 
all my paperwork. 
I also highly appreciate all the help provided to me and all the Rice international 
students by Dr. Adria Baker and the whole office of international students and 
scholars (OISS) staff. 
I would like to thank my family and friends for their unconditional love and 
support. I would specially like to thank my mom and dad for giving me all the love, 
care, and tenderness I needed to keep going through tough times. 
At last, I would like to thank the co-authors of my papers for their valuable input 
on my research during the past years. 
Abstract 
List of Illustrations 
List of Tables 
List of Abreviations . 
Contents 
ii 
ix 
xi 
XlI 
1 Introduction 1 
1.1 Thesis . . . 3 
1.2 Organization 6 
2 N-Variant Ie Design: Methodology and Applications 9 
2.1 Introduction.......... 10 
2.1.1 Motivational example. 
2.1.2 Paper organization 
2.2 Background 
2.2.1 FSM 
2.2.2 N-variant method . 
2.3 N -variant I C design . . . . 
2.4 Application-specific management of the N-variants . 
2.5 Experimental results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
2.5.1 Implementation of the N-variant method 
2.5.2 Embedded multimedia application. 
2.6 Concluding remarks and future directions. 
3 Active Hardware Metering for Intellectual Property Pro-
12 
13 
14 
14 
15 
16 
20 
22 
23 
25 
27 
VI 
tection and Security 30 
3.1 Introduction . 31 
3.2 Preliminaries 34 
3.2.1 Background 34 
3.2.2 Global flow 36 
3.3 Related work ... 38 
3.4 Active hardware metering 40 
3.4.1 Method ...... 41 
3.4.2 Ensuring proper operation 43 
3.5 Low overhead implementation and obfuscation . 45 
3.5.1 RUB implementation . 46 
3.5.2 BFSM implementation 47 
3.6 Attack resiliency ....... 51 
3.6.1 Description of attacks 52 
3.6.2 Counter measures . 54 
3.7 Experimental evaluations . 60 
3.7.1 Experiment setup . 60 
3.7.2 Overhead of active hardware metering 61 
3.7.3 Resiliency against the brute force attack 64 
3.8 Potential applications . 67 
3.9 Conclusion. . . . . . . 68 
4 Remote Activation of ICs for Piracy Prevention and Dig-
ital Right Management 70 
4.1 Introduction. 70 
4.2 Related Work 73 
4.3 Remote IC Activation 74 
4.4 Attacks ........ 77 
4.5 Experimental results . . . . . . . . . . . 
4.5.1 Area, delay, and power overheads 
4.5.2 Diversity of the keys 
4.6 Conclusion.......... 
5 Active Control and Digital Rights Management of Inte-
grated Circuit IP Cores 
5.1 Introduction . 
5.2 Related Work 
5.3 Flow of the Active Control for IP Cores . 
5.4 IP Control Method 
5.4.1 BFSMs. 
5.4.2 CFSM 
5.4.3 PDF. 
5.5 Implementation 
5.5.1 BFSM Implementation 
5.5.2 PDF Implementations 
5.5.3 CFSM Implementation 
5.6 Attacks and Safeguards . 
5.7 Experimental Results. 
5.8 Applications . 
5.9 Conclusion. . 
Vll 
77 
77 
79 
80 
81 
82 
85 
86 
88 
88 
89 
90 
91 
91 
92 
94 
94 
96 
98 
100 
6 N-Version Temperature-Aware Scheduling and Binding101 
6.1 Introduction. 102 
6.2 Related work 
6.3 Flow ..... 
6.4 N-version scheduling / binding. 
103 
104 
105 
6.5 Rotational N-version method. 
6.6 Experimental evaluations. 
6.7 Conclusion . 
7 Conclusion 
7.1 Contributions 
7.2 Future Directions 
Bibliography 
Vlll 
106 
108 
111 
114 
114 
116 
118 
Illustrations 
1.1 An example of state space diversity. . . . . . . . . . 
1.2 An algorithm and its implementation in hardware .. 
1.3 An example of spatial diversity. . 
1.4 An example of temporal diversity. 
2.1 A 4-variant Design .. . . 
2.2 Design of an N-variant circuit. 
2.3 Implementation choice for the experiments .. 
2.4 Flow of MPEG video compression flow .. 
3.1 Example of a 8TG with five states. The inputs required for 
state-to-state transition are shown next to the edges. . .. 
3.2 The global flow of the active hardware metering approach. 
3.3 The boosted FSM (BFSM). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
3.4 Illustration of steps for building a sparse 3-bit 8TG. 
3.5 Obfuscation of the original STG. 
3.6 Example of a black hole FSM. 
3.7 A simplified SFFSM . .... . 
3.8 Percentage of (a) power; and (b) area; overheads vs. size after adding 
3 
4 
5 
6 
13 
18 
24 
25 
35 
37 
43 
49 
51 
55 
57 
al 5 FFs 8TG. .............................. 64 
4.1 F8M with a lock on the replicated state (82).. . • . • • • . • . . . .• 72 
x 
4.2 Close-up of the locking/unlocking mechanism. 72 
4.3 A non-linear unclonable random unique block. 76 
4.4 Area, delay, and power overhead for different numbers of extra states 
for benchmark s298. ......................... 80 
4.5 The average number of inputs producing unique output for 1,000 
different RUBs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 . 
5.1 A reuser's design including multiple IP cores. Each IP may be 
locked/unlocked by the IP designer or the reuser, depending on the 
application. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
5.2 The flow of the active control for integrated circuits' IP cores. 
5.3 PUF challenge/response pairs. 
5.4 System block diagram. . . . . 
5.5 Implementation of the BFSM. 
5.6 Implementation of the PUF .. 
5.7 Implementation of the CFSM. 
5.8 The change of the overhead with increasing the number of IPs 
sharing the PUF ......................... . 
84 
87 
90 
91 
91 
93 
94 
99 
6.1 Flow of the rotational N-version thermal-aware scheduling and binding. .. 104 
Tables 
1.1 List of included published work. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 8 
2.1 Area overhead of the N-variants implementation.. . . . . . . 26 
2.2 Power and delay overheads of the N-variant implementation. 27 
2.3 The overhead for 29-variants (m = 2), 218-variants (m = 4), and 
236-variants (m = 8) DCT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 
3.1 Area overhead of active metering for various benchmarks. . . . . . .. 62 
3.2 Delay and power overhead of active metering for various benchmarks. 63 
3.3 Average number of attempts needed for the brute force attack to 
unlock the added STG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 
3.4 Percentage of area and power overheads after adding one blackhole. 67 
4.1 Area overhead for adding six extra states for Random and Heuristic 
state selection. 78 
4.2 Delay and power overhead for Random and Heuristic selection methods. 79 
5.1 The overhead of BFSM modifications for one IP. . 
5.2 CFSM overhead for integration of five IPs ..... 
6.1 Max temp. improvement (min resources) .. 
6.2 Max temp. improvement (add resources) .. 
97 
98 
109 
110 
xii 
6.3 Area overhead of the N-versions in Table 6.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 111 
xiii 
Abreviations 
• AFSM:, Authentication Finite State Machine 
• ASIC: Application Specific Integrated Circuit 
• BFS: Breadth-First Search 
• BFSM: Boosted Finite State Machine 
• BLIF: Berkeley Logic Interchange Format 
• CA: Certification Authority 
• CAR: Capture And Replay 
• CDFG: Control DataFlow Graph 
• CFSM: Control Finite state Machine 
• DAG: Direct Acyclic Graph 
• DFG: DataFlow Graph 
• DRM: Digital Rights Management 
• ECC: Error Correction Code 
• FF: FlipFlop 
• FM: Flexibility Metric 
• FPGA: Field Programmable Gate Array 
xiv 
• FSM: Finite State Machine 
• GD: Global Diversity 
• HLS: High-Level Synthesis 
• IC: Integrated Circuit 
• IP: Intellectual Property 
• LD: Local Diversity 
• MV: Manufacturing Variability 
• NMR: N-Modular Redundancy 
• NVP: N-Version Programming 
• NVS: N-Version Software 
• NVX: N-version eXecution 
• PKC: Public Key Cryptography 
• PUF: Physically Unclonable Function 
• RB: Recovery Block 
• RFID: Radio-Frequency IDentification 
• RTL: Register Thansfer Level 
• STG: State Thansition Graph 
1 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Lightweight embedded devices have stringent area and power constraints. Such de-
vices need to be portable with long battery life. A designer can consider an ASIC or 
an FPGA implementation for such devices. The power and area constraints make an 
ASIC implementation of such devices the natural choice, especially when the mass 
production of these devices is to be considered. On the other hand, FPGAs can be 
economical when only a small quantity of the devices is to be manufactured. 
Other issues that arise in the design and manufacture of these devices, however, 
complicate the decision. In many applications, the device would benefit from flexi-
bility that is not available in ASICs derived from conventional designs. For example: 
• After manufacturing, the designer might want to tweak the design to improve 
the performance of an individual chip. 
• The designer might also prefer to provide different implementations of the same 
design that can operate at different points on the energy / performance curve. 
• Functionality can be varied (for instance some features can be limited or dis-
abled) depending on the customer who buys the chip. 
While an FPGA implementation can easily achieve these goals, it is more diffi-
cult to address these points using an ASIC implementation without incurring large 
overheads. This thesis explores one option to address the problem: embed multiple 
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implementations of the control circuitry in the same design. We call this technique 
N-variant hardware design. 
This thesis explores the techniques required to implement N-variant design in 
a standard ASIC design flow, a necessity if these techniques are to have practical 
application. It demonstrates how to use N-variant design to achieve two distinct kinds 
of diversity: state space diversity and schedule diversity. This diversity is useful in 
its own right, as it allows an ASIC designer to achieve the goals that we laid out 
earlier. Variants of the control circuitry can be designed to have identical or slightly 
different functionalities depending on the target application. We can summarize the 
objectives as follows. 
1. Using the standard ASIC flow to implement N-variants gives the N-variant 
methodology all the performance advantages of ASICs. 
2. Embedding multiple variants of the control circuitry of the design on chip, either 
by manipulating the state space of the design or by manipulating the schedule 
of the design, can be used to make the chip more robust and resilient against 
security attacks. 
3. The N-variant methodology manipulates the control part of the circuit. Since 
the control part represents a small fraction of the whole chip (about 1% [1]), 
the overhead due to the added redundancy is expected to be low. 
Given the basic tools for N-Variant Design, we can attack more complex design 
problems. For example, we can use the tools of N-variant design to design ASICs 
that have chip-specific locks to protect the IC or to protect individual IP cores on 
the IC. These locks can be used to require a chip specific key that resets the chip's 
initial state to an operable state, or to check continuously for the presence of a key 
(a)FSM 
--
I 
I 
I 
(b) Version 1 (e) Version 2 
Figure 1.1 : An example of state space diversity. 
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and protect against unauthorized use. These locks exploit individual variation in the 
ASIC coupled with multiple variant control circuits and circuit obfuscation to create 
ASICs that require a unique key per manufactured chip to operate. The computation 
of the key requires both knowledge of the individual chip, obtained from specific test 
vectors, and knowledge of the obfuscated design, which the designer holds private. 
1.1 Thesis 
My thesis is that by intelligently embedding different implementations of a part of 
the design in an Ie, one can achieve the flexibility and diversity needed to protect an 
embedded device or tune its performance while maintaining low overhead and without 
significantly changing the current design flow. 
To support this thesis, we propose two different levels of adding diversity to a cir-
cuit: state space diversity, and scheduling diversity. State space diversity is achieved 
by adding states to the finite state machine (FSM) representing the control part of a 
system. Figure 1.1 (a) shows an example of adding state space diversity to an FSM 
where we make a copy S~ (shown in black) of state So and all the transitions to and 
from it (duplicated transitions are shown as dashed lines). Figures 1.1 (b) and (c) 
show the two different versions of the FSM. In the first version we use states So, 
a b 
y 
(a) Algorithm: 
y=a+2b+c 
(b) Implementation 
Figure 1.2 : An algorithm and its implementation in hardware. 
4 
81 , and 82, and in the second version we use 8b, 81, and 82. While both versions 
of the FSM are functionally equivalent, 8 0 and 8b are represented by different state 
encodings. Thus, if the designer provides means of checking the state encoding at 
runtime, and after the initial setting each customer (a chip used) is associated with 
a version, traversing the edge from 8 1 to 80 or 8b can be used to verify the identity 
of the chip running the design. 
Variant FSMs can have different state encodings [2], have different extra FSM 
parts added to them [3], or differ in a subset of the states and transitions [4]. We 
show the application of state space diversity to active hardware metering and IP 
rights protection in [2, 3, 4, 5]. 
Scheduling diversity is implemented by manipulating the scheduling and bind-
ing algorithms used for high-level synthesis of circuits. In high-level synthesis an 
algorithm is compiled into a hardware circuit by converting it first into a control 
dataflow graph (CDFG); then scheduling, allocating, and binding the CDFG, and 
finally, converting the schedule into an FSM representing the controller and a data-
path containing the ALUs, memory and communication logic. Figure 1.2(a) shows 
an example of a CDFG for a simple algorithm that computes y = a + 2b + c. Fig-
(a) Version 1 
c1 : t=ADD1 (a,b) 
w=ADD2 (b,c) 
------------~~~ 
c2: y=ADD1 (t,W) 
(b) Version 2 
c 1 : t=ADD1 (a,b) 
w=ADD2 (b,c) 
c2: y=ADD1 (t,W) 
Figure 1.3 : An example of spatial diversity. 
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ure 1.2(b) shows the hardware implementation of the algorithm using two hardware 
adders ADDl and ADD2 and a controller. We manipulate the controller to generate 
designs with different types of scheduling diversity: spatial and temporal. 
Figure 1.3 shows how we can add spatial diversity to the implementation of the 
simple algorithm described above. The control steps are shown as C l and C2 . For the 
first version shown in Figure 1.3(a), the controller uses ADDl and ADD2 to compute 
the intermediate results t and W respectively. Then it uses AD Dl in the second 
control step to compute the final result y. This way ADD2 is only used in half the 
control cycles in the first version. In the second version shown in Figure 1.3(b), the 
controller uses AD D2 in the second control cycle to compute y. Thus, in the second 
version AD Dl is used half the time and we have spatial diversity in the activities of 
different modules on the chip. 
Temporal diversity can be implemented in a similar way as spatial diversity. How-
ever, for temporal diversity the controller is manipulated to run at different control 
steps to generate versions with different delays. Figure 1.4 shows an example for 
temporal diversity. In the first version shown in Figure 1.4(a), the controller executes 
the computation of y in two control steps. In the first step it computes t and w, 
then in the second step it computes the final result y. In the second version shown in 
Figure l.4(b), the controller does the computation in three steps. It computes t in the 
(a) Version 1 
c1 : t=ADD1 (a,b) 
w=ADD2 (b/c) 
------------~~~ 
c 2 : y=ADD1 (t/w) 
(b) Version 2 
c 1 : t=ADD1 (a,b) 
c2 : w=ADD2 (b/c) 
c 3 : y=ADD1 (t/w) 
Figure 1.4 : An example of temporal diversity. 
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first step, w in the second step, and y in the third step. This way, the second version 
takes an extra control step to compute the result. Temporal diversity can be used 
in systems that require different deadlines for different tasks. For tasks that have a 
longer time to execute, one can slow down the system and thus reduce the power con-
sumption by disabling the unused modules. For energy savings, the designer might 
use the same adder in all three cycles of an operation, thus avoiding any energy cost 
incurred by enabling and disabling the adders on different cycles. In this scheme, the 
designer might provide two control FSMs, one that used AD Dl and the other that 
used ADD2 • For heat distribution, the design could cycle between them. 
1.2 Organization 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. The use of the N-variant methodology to 
add state space diversity is presented, along with potential applications, in Chapter 2. 
That chapter shows a method that automatically replicates the state of a design by 
duplicating a subset of the logic gates used to implement the design. This method 
can be applied automatically to any synthesized design that includes an FSM. 
Chapters 3 and 4 present two different methods to implement state space diversity. 
In Chapter 3, we use replication to duplicate states in the controller of a design. The 
7 
method adds a large number of extra stages to the design by adding extra loops to the 
original FSM. Manufacturing variability is used in conjunction with state replication 
to illustrate how to take advantage of state diversity in active hardware metering of 
ICs. Chapter 4 incorporates state diversity by duplicating a small subset of the states 
and edges in the design, with remote activation of ICs as an illustrative application. 
Chapter 5 shows how to use state diversity to provide a data rights management 
platform for IP protection. 
Chapter 6 illustrates the use of scheduling diversity to control peak temperature 
of an IC during operation. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and suggests future 
work in this area. 
Chapters 2 through 6 have already appeared in print. The content has been 
reformatted to fit Rice University thesis form, but has not otherwise been changed*. 
Table 1.1 shows the proper citations for those chapters, including the collaborators 
who are co-authors on those papers. 
*Because Chapters 2 through 6 reproduce published work, they appear unchanged. A careful 
reader will note that the overall percentage improvements in those chapters are presented as the 
average of the improvements. In other areas of Computer Science, these numbers might be computed 
using the aggregate improvement or the geometric mean. 
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Table 1 1 . List of included published work. 
Chapter Citation 
Chapter 2 Y. Alkabani and F. Koushanfar, N-variant IC design: methodology and 
applications, in Design Automation Conference (DAC), pp. 546-551, 
2008. 
Chapter 3 Y. Alkabani and F. Koushanfar, Active hardware metering for intellec-
tual property protection and security, in USENIX Security Symposium, 
pp. 291-306, 2007. 
Chapter 4 Y. Alkabani, F. Koushanfar, and M. Potkonjak, Remote activation of 
ics for piracy prevention and digital right management, in IEEE/ ACM 
International Conference on Computer Aided Design (ICCAD), pp. 674-
677, 2007. 
Chapter 5 Y. Alkabani and F. Koushanfar,Y. Alkabani and F. Koushanfar, Active 
control and digital rights management of integrated circuit IP cores, in 
ACM/IEEE International Conference on Compilers, Architectures, and 
Synthesis for Embedded Systems (CASES), pp. 227-234, 2008. 
Chapter 6 Y. Alkabani, F. Koushanfar, and M. Potkonjak, N-version temperature-
aware scheduling and binding, in International Symposium on Low 
Power Electronics and Designs (ISLPED), pp. 331-334, 2009. 
Chapter 2 
N-Variant Ie Design: Methodology and 
Applicatipns* 
Abstract 
9 
We propose the first method for designing N-variant sequential circuits. The flex-
ibility provided by the N-variants enables a number of important tasks, including 
IP protection, IP metering, security, design optimization, self-adaptation and fault-
tolerance. The method is based on extending the finite state machine (FSM) of the 
design to include multiple variants of the same design specification. The state transi-
tions are managed by added signals that may come from various triggers depending 
on the target application. We devise an algorithm for implementing the N-variant 
Ie design. We discuss the necessary manipulations of the added signals that would 
facilitate the various tasks. The key advantage to integrating the heterogeneity in the 
functional specification of the design is that we can configure the variant during or 
post-manufacturing, but removal, extraction or deletion of the variants is not viable. 
Experimental results on benchmark circuits demonstrate that the method can be au-
tomatically and efficiently implemented. Because of its lightweight, N-variant design 
is particularly well-suited for securing embedded systems. As a proof-of-concept, we 
implement the N-variant method for protection of content of portable media players, 
e.g., iPod. We discuss how N-variant design methodology readily enables new digital 
*This work is published in: Y. Alkabani and F. Koushanfar, N-variant IC design: methodology 
and applications, in Design Automation Conference (DAC), pp. 546-551,2008. 
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rights management methods. 
2.1 Introduction 
N-variant design is the generation of N 2: 2 realizations of the same initial design 
description. T1!e advantage of the technique is that it provides ~mproved flexibility, 
robustness, attack resiliency, and design diversity. The strength and usefulness of 
N-variant designs was previously demonstrated for programs [6], virtual machines 
[7], and for achieving architectural heterogeneity [7]. While the method was initially 
intended for providing fault-tolerance, recent applications in security of computer 
systems, software and data has amplified its importance. Many attacks that take 
advantage of the specific and stationary nature of the underlying platform, may be 
eliminated by using N-variants [7, 6]. 
We propose the first methodology for designing N-variant IGs. The method works 
at the functional specification level, or by scripts that automatically perform pre-
synthesis alterations. We construct a single hardware design consisting of multiple 
variants that are planned to have several exploitation sets. Note that it is also possible 
to do N-variant design post-synthesis. The drawback is that the design would become 
vulnerable to removal attacks. The advantage of pre-synthesis alternation is that all 
of the variants become an integral part of the functionality pertinent design, making 
the removal attack detrimental to the whole structure. 
N-variant Ie design has a number of important applications. 
(i) Hardware IP protection and digital rights management: New semiconductor busi-
ness models can be enabled by the N-variant design, e.g., different versions of one 
design can be sold to various vendors, enabling an automatic way to trace the IGs. 
(ii) Usage and content metering: Alternation of the variants can be used for enumer-
11 
ating the usage of IC components that run software/ media files, or in conjunction 
with unclonable chip IDs for metering the usage of an ICs. 
(iii) Security: There is a need to prevent the exploits that target a homogeneous 
design from working on all the ICs [7]. Selection of different variants provides an 
effective countermeasure against the attacks. 
(iv) Post-silicon optimization: Because of the manufacturing variability, for each 
IC, the designer can use the testing results to select the variant that has the best 
power / delay characteristics. 
(v) Self-adaptation: Due to the impact of variability in operational conditions, e.g., 
aging, the IC can be designed such that it can adapt its structure over time. 
(vi) fault-tolerance: The inherent redundancy provided by N-variants enables fault-
tolerance. 
Integration of N-variants at the functional level is done by altering the FSM and 
adding several states to it. By managing (controlling) the inputs to state-transitions, 
one would be able to select different variants of the design. The management inputs 
may come from various triggers, that depend on the target task for the N-variant 
design. We discuss in detail how the management may be altered for the various 
applications that we are considering. 
The key advantage of using FSM is that it is not extractable from the synthe-
sized design. Thus, even for a party who has access to the synthesized hardware 
IP, changing the FSM or extracting the original single-variant design would need an 
effort equivalent to redoing all the stages of design and implementation. For our 
purposes, the FSM can be safely assumed inextricable. Another important benefit 
of FSM is that certain aspects of FSM are inexpensively verifiable post-silicon. The 
inextricability and verifiability properties of the FSM were previously used for water-
12 
marking and for hiding information inside the design, and for remote activation and 
disabling [8, 9, 4]. As it was shown in the context of watermarking and IC activa-
tion/ disabling, careful constraint manipulation and don't care planning can greatly 
reduce the overhead of FSM modifications. The new method is particularly well-
suited for lightweight embedded systems applications. This is because the N-variant 
design enables lightweight mechanisms for protection and security of IP, software 
and content. The overhead of implementing traditional cryptographic protocols is 
huge, often overwhelming the constrained resources of an embedded system [10]. As 
a proof-of-concept, we demonstrate application of N-variant IC design for content us-
age metering of portable multimedia devices with an embedded MPEG compression 
module. 
2.1.1 Motivational example 
Figure 2.1 illustrates a motivational example, where the FSM of the design is shown 
by a state transition graph (STG) that has four states: So, SI, S2, and S3. This FSM 
is the first variant. We replicate this design three times to have: s~, s~, s;, and s~ as 
the first copy (the second variant), s~, s~ , s~, and s~ as the second copy (the third 
variant), and S~/, S~/, S~/, and S~' as the third copy (the fourth variant). Thus, we 
construct a 4-variant circuit. The different copies can share FFs at the synthesis step 
to reduce the overhead. By careful state assignment, one can ensure that the FFs 
needed for each variant to function properly are different in at least one FF. This way, 
even if a FF is corrupted, there are still other copies that can function properly. In 
Figure 2.1, we show an example of how the FFs can be shared between the different 
variants. Assume that we implement the design using 4 FFs. The four FFs denoted 
by Fl, F2 , F3 , and F4 are shown in front of each variant. The FFs in white affect 
13 
the functionality of the variant, while the FFs in gray do not affect the functionality 
of the variant (although they can keep flipping all the time for obfuscation reasons 
depending on the application). For instance, the first variant can use g, and F2 
shown in white, while F3 , and F4 do not affect its functionality. However, the second 
variant is affected by Fl and F4 • Thus, if F2 is corrupted, the first variant will not 
function properly, but the second will. For the circuit to properly function, it is 
enough to have one correctly functional variant selected. However, depending on the 
application, we can choose to switch between different variants, or to prefer a variant 
over the other based on their performances. Thus, the selection function shown in 
Figure 2.1 is application dependent as discussed in Section 2.4. 
Figure 2.1 : A 4-variant Design 
2.1.2 Paper organization 
In the next section, we discuss the background and related work along the lines of 
FSM and the N-variant concept. In Section 2.3 we devise an algorithm for efficient in-
tegration of the N-variants. Section 2.4 demonstrates how the variant selection inputs 
can be managed to facilitate various applications. Experimental results evaluating 
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the overhead of the method on standard benchmarks are presented in Section 6.6. 
The proof-of-concept implementation for metering multimedia files is also reported. 
Section 6.7 concludes the paper and outlines a number of future research directions. 
2.2 Background 
We describe the background and related literature in FSM and N-variant systems 
that has influenced and inspired our work. 
2.2.1 FSM 
A FSM is a dynamic discrete system with limited number of states that maps input 
sequences into output sequences. It can be used to represent a sequential function, 
e.g., sequential circuits. A FSM is typically defined by a 6-tuple M=CE,tl,Q,qo,6,>.), 
where 
- ~ =1= 0 is a finite set of input alphabets; 
- tl =1= 0 is a finite set of output alphabets; 
- Q={ qo,qI, . .. }=I= 0 is a bounded set of states; 
- qo c Q is the set of initial states; 
- 6 (q, a) is transition function on input a and set Q x ~ ---+ Q; 
- >. (q, a) is output function for input a and set Q x ~ ---+ tl; 
The STG is used to represent the state transitions and input/output relations of 
the FSM; nodes correspond to states and edges define the input/output conditions 
for state transitions. 
FSMs are used for information hiding and watermarking purposes. Oliveira pro-
poses to alter the STG such that a signature is mapped to a spacial topological 
property in the sequence of states traversed by a sequence of inputs [8]. Yuan and Qu 
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exploit the existence of redundant transitions and manipulate them to hide informa-
tion inside the FSM without altering the minimized FSM [9]. Alkabani et al. use a 
combination of physically unclonable functions and state replication to uniquely lock 
each 10 [4]. The lock is interleaved with combinational and sequential transitions and 
can be used for enabling/disabling of the 10. The unlocking is done by sequence of 
inputs that can only be generated by knowing the FSM structure. 
The classic way for fault-tolerance FSM design is triple modular redundancy 
(TMR) , where three copies of FSM are concurrently run and the correct output 
value is determined by voting [11]. Even though TMR may be viewed as a basic 
N-variant design method, we emphasize that the new N-variant methodology is not a 
simple replication of the FSMs. Instead, the variants are elegantly interwind within 
the original design. N-variant design has applications that TMR or other traditional 
fault-tolerant design methods do not support. 
Our N-variant design algorithm is devised to have a low-overhead. A class of 
methods that is relevant to our work is state assignment and state minimization of 
large FSM networks [12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. The concepts and methods used in FSM 
minimization may help to even lower the overhead of N-variant designs in the future. 
2.2.2 N-variant method 
N-version software development was introduced as early as 1968 [17]. The goal was to 
achieve fault-tolerance [18, 19]. N-versioning collects N copies of the target software 
written by different programmers and then runs them in parallel, using the redun-
dancy in the results to achieve fault-tolerance. N-versioning is different from N-variant 
since N-variant systems include multiple copies within the same design that appear 
different. So far, the main usage of N-variants has been for security purposes [7, 6]. 
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The motivating idea is that most systems are homogeneous and the same exploit can 
attack all instances of the system. The specific machine-level characteristics of the 
attacked computer is used by the binary exploits, e.g, byte order, calling conventions, 
program load addresses, etc. If the system is not exactly the same, the exploit would 
not be able to adjust itself and the attack will be halted. 
Achieving a heterogeneous computer system by using randomization was first 
introduced by Forrest et al [20]. Cox et al. present an architectural framework that 
systematically uses automated diversity that provides detection and disruption of a 
large class of attacks [6]. Holland et al. extended the idea of achieving heterogeneity 
by generating the architecture-dependent parts of kernel and standard C library from 
machine description [7]. Their approach successfully suppresses the risks of code 
injection attacks and state corruption attacks. 
As we have mentioned in Section 2.1, N-variant IC design can enable many more 
tasks than just security and attack resiliency. Perhaps the most interesting appli-
cations are in the domain of IP protection and enabling new business models, and 
for post-silicon optimization and self-adaptations of the ICs. Furthermore, because 
the N-variants are embedded into the hardware, the overhead is smaller than embed-
ding them into the virtual machine and/or the architecture. The low overhead of the 
N-variant IC renders it suitable for embedded systems applications. 
2.3 N-variant Ie design 
In this section we discuss how the N-variant circuit can be designed. Figure 2.2 
demonstrates the flow of our design. The implementation steps can be summarized 
as follows: 
1. A single copy of the FSM is implemented as a group of FFs connected to the 
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input and output through combinational circuits logicl and logic2 respectively, 
as shown in Figure 2.2(a). 
2. Modify the FSM as shown in Figure 2.2(b) as follows: 
(a) Select the parameter m representing the number of replications of the FFs 
in the circuit. 
(b) Partition logicl into logicla and logiclb and replicate logicla for m times. 
(c) Partition logic2 into logic2a and logi~b and replicate logicla for m times. 
(d) Design the obfuscation logic and the selection logic to maintain the correct 
circuit's functionality. The obfuscation logic is implemented at the input 
side and is used to distinguish between different variants, and to generate 
dummy values in the unused FFs. The selection logic is used at the output 
side to select the output of the target variant. Note that when a variant 
is not selected it does not have to generate correct outputs. 
Selection of the number of replications and the way the combinational circuits are 
partitioned yield the state-space of all possible implementations. Each choice requires 
a minimal complexity of the obfuscation and selection logics. It is worth noting here 
that the choice is also affected by the application targeted by the N-variant design 
method. 
It is clear that the overhead of the implementation varies greatly with the choice 
of m, the partitioning of the combinational circuit, and the complexity of both the 
obfuscation and selection logic blocks. The area and power overheads of the methods 
are affected mainly by m, and by the partitioning of the combinational circuits. The 
delay is only affected by the selection and obfuscation logic. At one extreme, one can 
set m = N, logiCia = logiCi, and logiCib = 0, while implementing the selection logic as 
logic,. + 1ogI .... -logic, 
IogIcC'I ... copy of 
logic 
(a) Original FSM (b) N-varlant FSM 
Figure 2.2 : Design of an N-variant circuit. 
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a multiplexer and discarding the obfuscation logic. This configuration produces the 
highest area and power overheads, and the lowest delay. At the other extreme, one 
can set m = 1, logic"a = 0, logic"b = logic". This leads to an obfuscated circuit, and 
produces the lowest area and power overheads, and the highest delays. The potential 
impact of each of the possible design parameters is as follows . 
• FFs. The FFs represent the memory of the FSM, they can be replicated m times 
where m ~ 1; m = 1 means the FFs are all shared and this removes a big part 
of redundancy in our implementation. However, the method can still have multiple 
variants by manipulating the logic blocks. 
• Logicl. This circuit component represents the combinational part of the circuit at 
the input side. It is divided into two parts: logicla and logic1b. Logic1a is to be 
replicated m times, and logiclb is shared. Increasing the size of logicla leads to larger 
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area and power overheads. However, it does not affect the delay overhead. Despite 
the introduction of more area and power overheads, it can be useful for applications 
with timing constraint. 
• Logic2' This circuit represents the combinational part of the circuit at the output of 
the FFs. It is divided into two parts: logic2a and logic2b' Logic2a is to be replicated 
m times, and logic2b is shared. Just like the case in logicla, increasing the size of 
logic2a leads to larger area and power overheads and can be useful for applications 
targeting performance improvement and fault-tolerance. 
• Obfuscation logic. The obfuscation is used to adjust the inputs for different variants. 
The more FFs are shared between variants, the more complex this part will be. 
However, in cases where few FFs are shared, this part is used to generate dummy 
values in the unused FFs. This can be useful for security applications. 
• Selection logic. This block is responsible for ensuring that the correct output from 
the target variant is selected. In case of many FF replications, it can be simply 
implemented as a multiplexer. However, as the number of shared FFs increases, it 
becomes increasingly important to interleave this block with the obfuscation logic to 
guarantee that the correct outputs are obtained regardless of the selected variant. 
The nature of the original circuit also affects the significance of the overhead. 
For instance, if the combinational logic is very small in area, power, and delay, even 
the slightest replications and the simplest obfuscation and selection logic will yield 
a significant overhead compared to the original one. Note that the area and power 
overhead of an FSM (representing the control part of a system) is extremely small 
compared to the overall area and power overhead of the system. 
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2.4 Application-specific management of the N-variants 
In this section, we describe a number of management methods that can enable each of 
the applications described in Section 2.1. The variant selection contains the following 
components and structures: • Trigger. A trigger prompts selection of a new variant. 
It may come from various sources, including the clock signals, an internaLcounter, a 
sequence of inputs, or an external signal. 
• Storage. The memory can be used in case selection of a variant is dictated by a 
stored key, or in case a counter should save its state in presence of rests. Also, many 
binary attacks may exploit a fixed memory address. To defend against this attack, 
all or some parts of the memory needs to by duplicated . 
• Driver. The driver uploads the new variant in case a trigger is activated. A driver 
may be as simple as a multiplexer uploading the variant selection key from a stored 
location, or it may be a driver FSM, e.g., an obfuscated counter. 
The above components can be used in various ways to manage the variant selection 
suited for a particular application. A few examples are as follows. 
(i) Hardware IP protection and digital rights management. An IC vendor could con-
figure its chips by using a fixed key specific to each customer. This provides a new 
mechanism to trace back the ICs in the supply chain. Also, many existing hardware 
IP protection methods can be readily used in N-variant settings. For example, the 
sequence of traversal among a few variants or within a variant could be utilized as a 
watermark or for hiding information [8, 9]. As another example, the N-variant struc-
ture could be integrated with the unique random number generated on each chip, for 
fingerprinting or locking the state transitions by the manufacturer [4]. 
(ii) Usage and content metering. The N-variants can be used to enforce licensing 
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agreement for the hardware, software, or content usage. Once the license agreement 
term is over, the IC would enter a nonfunctional state. The IP rights owner is the only 
entity that can load a new functional variant if a new license is obtained. A trigger 
by a clock or an internal counter can be used to save the number of uses or the 
time constraints. In case a counter is used, the states should be saved in an on-chip 
nonvolatile memory so the chip's reset would not affect the usage metering. Similar 
triggers were used for licensing of FPGA IPs [21], where it was noted that the trigger is 
vulnerable to memory reset/clock reset attacks. One possible countermeasure against 
this attack is to randomize the counter, so that resetting to zero would not traverse 
to the zero usage state. Many other counter obfuscation methods are possible. For 
example, one may initialize the counter by using a PUF, so different configurations 
will be needed depending on the unique IDs of each chip. 
(iii) Security. The system could be made heterogeneous by frequently alternating the 
FSM variant [7]. For example, in case of exploits that use a fixed memory address, 
the memory can be duplicated creating a master and a slave copy. Every time a new 
variant is selected, the master and the slave copies would switch. The slave would 
copy its content from the master. If an attack exploits an address on the master copy, 
it would halt once the master copy is altered. 
(iv) Post-silicon optimization. Because of the variability in CMOS technology, the 
variant with the best power or delay performance would be different on each IC. A 
spectrum of new post-manufacturing optimizations can be enabled by using the test 
data to determine the variant that has the best performance on each IC. For example, 
one may design the chips to have the maximum possible frequency, by selecting low 
feature sizes for the gates. Due to variability, some of the delays would be longer than 
planned, slowing down a few critical paths. 
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(v) Self-adaptation. The variants could be strategically uploaded using an offline or 
online monitoring method that manages the upload based on a certain target. For 
example, to be resilient against aging, one can equalize the amount of usage of the 
various components. Offline simulation of randomly selected variants can determine 
which components are used more in one variant. The variants with the largest differ-
ence in their usage patterns may be periodically loaded to equalize the aging effect. 
(vi) fault-tolerance. The flexibility and redundancy of the N-variant design can be 
utilized for providing fault-tolerance. For example, if a FF is shown to be faulty during 
the test phase, the configurations that do not use this FF will be uploaded. The fault-
tolerance can be implemented in more sophisticated ways, by adding a monitoring 
mechanism. As an example, a BIST structure can be included which periodically 
tests the circuit for faults due to aging, NBTI, or HCI effects. The correct variants 
could be managed accordingly. 
2.5 Experimental results 
In this section, we implement the N-variant method described in section 2.3 on bench-
mark designs and evaluate its performance. A program is written in C to generate 
N-variants for each design. The Berkeley SIS tool is used to simulate the results and 
to estimate the overhead. In the first subsection, we show the experimental results 
for applying the method on standard MCNC'91 benchmarks. In the second subsec-
tion, we demonstrate a DCT example as a proof-of-concept for applying the method 
to embedded multimedia applications. All the resulting circuits are mapped to the 
MCNC library. 
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2.5.1 Implementation of the N-variant method 
Figure 2.3 shows an implementation of the N-variant method for m = 2. Our design 
targets embedding at least one redundant component for each part, while maintaining 
low area, power, and delay overheads. We present the results for m = 2 and m = 4 
that translate to doubling and quadrupling the number of FFs respectively. . The 
obfuscation logic is implemented as a block of XOR gates that place different values 
in the unused FFs for each variant. The selection logic is implemented as a multiplexer 
block. The number of variants generated by this implementation for a circuit with 
k FFs is 2k for m = 2, and is 4k for m = 4. Our selection of each parameter of 
the N-variant design (see Section 2.3) and the impact of the choice on the target 
applications are as follows: 
• FFs. We selected m = 2 and m = 4. Selecting m = 2 ensures that the scheme has 
at least one spare FF for each variant; m = 4 provides more redundancy. 
• Logicl. We selected Logicla = 0, and logiclb=logicl. The choices are made to reduce 
the area and power overheads. However, fault-tolerance and post-silicon optimization 
are now only dependent on FF redundancies. 
• Logic2. We devised the following parameters: Logic2a = 0, and logic2b=logi~. The 
selection is made to reduce the area and to reduce the delay and power overhead. 
Again, fault-tolerance and post-silicon optimization are only dependent on FFs. 
• Obfuscation logic. For m = 2 and m = 4, only a half, or a quarter of the FFs are 
shared respectively. We select the obfuscation function to be a block of XOR gates 
that generate dummy values in the unused FFs. We limit the maximum number of 
variants to be 2k (for m = 2) and 4k (for m = 4) to keep the function simple and to 
constrain the delay overhead. Note that some of the variants can be reserved as trap 
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non-functional FSMs for security and IP protection applications. 
• Selection logic. This part is implemented as a multiplexer and is kept simple to 
avoid large delay overheads. 
Note that the parameter choices used in one implementation are driven by the 
designer's target application. The real results may be affected by many factors such 
as the original shape of the circuit, the gate library used, and different optimizations 
done on the circuit after modification. 
Figure 2.3 : Implementation choice for the experiments. 
Tables 6.3 and 2.2 show the respective area, power, and delay overheads for m = 2 
and m = 4. The evaluations on the used benchmarks show a maximum area and power 
overheads of 20% and 19% respectively, while the delay overhead was at most 17% 
for m = 2. The area and power overhead for m = 4 goes up to 48% and 62%, and 
the maximum delay overhead is 21%. It should be noted that the benchmarks with 
the highest overhead are very small. It is also interesting to note that sometimes the 
overhead is negative (the circuit is improved) because the resulting circuit maps to 
fewer gates in the MCNC library. The average area overhead is -0.65% and 12% for 
m = 2 and m = 4. The average power overhead increased from -3% for m = 2 to 15% 
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when m = 4. As expected the average delay overhead did not change by increasing 
m' it remained 10% in both cases for the evaluated benchmarks. All modifications , 
to the circuits are done on the netlist before mapping. The relative values are more 
important than the absolute values as the values in the library can be scaled down. 
It is worth noting here that the delay over head is the only important metric in real 
designs. This is because the FSM which constitutes the control part of the design is 
typically only a small part of the design, significantly less than 1% of the power/area 
[1]. Thus, even if the FSM's area or power is doubled, it will not significantly affect 
the overall design. 
2.5.2 Embedded multimedia application 
Figure 2.4 : Flow of MPEG video compression flow. 
We report the results of implementing the N-variant method for content usage 
metering for embedded multimedia applications. The key observation that facili-
tates ultra-low overhead implementation is that the N-variants do not need to be 
instrumented in all parts of the design; only the critical parts of the design can be 
strategically selected and augmented. In our multimedia example, we implement N-
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Original m=2 m=4 
BM PI PO FFs Area Area % Area % 
dk16 2 3 5 461 482 4.6 535 16.1 
keyb 7 2 5 461 490 6.3 535 16.1 
planet 7 19 6 887 914 3.0 975 9.9 
planet 1 7 19 6 887 914 3.0 975 9.9 
pma 8 8 5 346 382 lOA 419 21.1 
81488 8 19 6 880 915 4.0 973 10.6 
8208 11 2 5 148 178 20.3 219 48.0 
8420 19 2 5 148 151 2.0 191 29.1 
8820 18 19 5 429 256 -40.3 296 -31.0 
8832 18 19 5 427 271 -36.5 316 -26.0 
8tyr 9 10 5 633 662 4.6 716 13.1 
tma 7 6 5 287 318 10.8 362 26.1 
Table 2.1 : Area overhead of the N-variants implementation. 
variants in the DCT part of the design, the essential component for audio, image, and 
video signal processing. Figure 204 shows a typical MPEG video compression flow 
which contains both DCT and IDCT components. 
Table 2.3 shows the results for applying the implementation described above to 
the DCT control circuit. The original DCT circuit has 9 FFs. We evaluated N-
variant implementations with 29-variants (m = 2), 218-variants (m = 4), and 236_ 
variants (m = 8). The area, power, and delay overheads for m = 2 are 6%, 5% and 
15.5%, respectively. Changing m and keeping the obfuscation and selection logic the 
27 
Original m=2 m=4 
BM Power Delay Power % Delay % Power % Delay % 
dk16 1649.8 97.7 1712 3.8 106.6 9.1 1935.1 17.3 107.6 10.1 
keyb 1546.5 61.5 1635.5 5.8 67.6 9.9 1837.3 18.8 68.4 11.2 
planet 3103.5 187.9 3156 1.7 219.4 16.8 3471.1 11.8 195.6 4.1 
planet 1 3103.5 187.9 3156 1.7 219.4 16.8 3471.1 11.8 195.6 4.1 
pma 1250.3 61 1309.8 4.8 67.9 11.3 1550.4 24.0 73.4 20.3 
81488 3007.3 134.9 3088.7 2.7 152.7 13.2 3378.3 12.3 144.8 7.3 
8208 480.4 25.4 573.6 19.4 26.9 5.9 779.1 62.2 30.9 21.7 
8420 480.4 25.4 462.9 -3.6 26.9 5.9 667.1 38.9 30.5 20.1 
8820 1423.9 33.7 790.7 -44.5 36 6.8 1007.9 -29.2 31.8 -5.6 
8832 1445.1 33.6 855.4 -40.8 36.7 9.2 1089.9 -24.6 36.8 9.5 
8tyr 2170.2 128.2 2272 4.7 144.9 13.0 2470.6 13.8 134.9 5.2 
tma 989.3 64.8 1062.1 7.4 71.1 9.7 1287.9 30.2 72.7 12.2 
Table 2.2 : Power and delay overheads of the N-variant implementation. 
same, has a significant impact on the area and power overheads. For m = 4 the 
area and power overheads increase to 16% and 18%, and for m = 8 the area and 
power overheads reach 36% and 42%. However, the change in the delay overhead is 
insignificant. 
2.6 Concluding remarks and future directions 
We introduce N-variant design methodology, a novel design method that creates N ~ 
2 copies of the same design. The strength and usefulness of N-variant design was 
previously shown for systems, software, and architectural components. However, no 
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Orig. m=2 % m=4 % m=8 % 
Area 821 871 6.1 955 16.3 1117 36.1 
Power 2946 3084 4.7 3490 18.5 4198 42.5 
Delay 123.8 143 15.5 140 13.1 139.7 12.8 
Table 2.3 : The overhead for 29-variants (m = 2), 218-variants (m = 4), and 236_ 
variants (m = 8) DCT. 
scheme for generation of N-variant designs was introduced, beyond simple replication 
of the whole structure for fault-tolerance. We devise an algorithm for implementing 
the N-variant design that works by extending the FSM such that it would include 
multiple variants of the same design. We demonstrate how the scheme could be 
utilized to enable a number of important applications, including hardware and content 
IP protection, IP metering, security, design optimization, self-adaptation and fault-
tolerance. We also discuss how the input signals could be managed for enabling each of 
the target applications. The experimental results on benchmark circuits demonstrate 
the efficiency of the proposed algorithm in terms of area, power and delay. We 
also present a proof-of-concept implementation of the method for N-veriant design of 
MPEG decoders by only manipulating one of its circuit component, namely DCT. 
Experimental evaluations shows the suitability of the method for embedded systems 
applications. 
The N-variant design methodology has a great potential to impact various ap-
plications and lays the ground for much more research. Potential future research 
directions include implementation of the method on real lCs, careful development of 
the digital rights management methods that exploit the N-variants as the underlying 
mechanisms, finding more efficient methods for implementing the N-variants, devising 
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on-chip monitoring mechanisms so that the N-variants could be automatically used 
for self-adaptation method, and design and implementation of post-silicon optimiza-
tion scheme that exploit the multiplicity of the variants. Last but not least, better 
identification and classification of possible attacks against the introduced security 
and protection mechanisms, particularly those for monitoring the vulnerability of the 
system against the binary attacks must be performed. 
Chapter 3 
Active Hardware Metering for Intellectual 
Property 
Protection and Security* 
Abstract 
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We introduce the first active hardware metering scheme that aims to protect inte-
grated circuits (IC) intellectual property (IP) against piracy and runtime tampering. 
The novel metering method simultaneously employs inherent unclonable variability 
in modern manufacturing technology, and functionality preserving alternations of the 
structural IC specifications. Active metering works by enabling the designers to lock 
each IC and to remotely disable it. The objectives are realized by adding new states 
and transitions to the original finite state machine (FSM) to create boosted finite 
state machines(BFSM) of the pertinent design. A unique and unpredictable ID gen-
erated by an IC is utilized to place an BFSM into the power-up state upon activation. 
The designer, knowing the transition table, is the only one who can generate input 
sequences required to bring the BFSM into the functional initial (reset) state. To 
facilitate remote disabling of ICs, black hole states are integrated within the BFSM. 
We introduce nine types of potential attacks against the proposed active metering 
method. We further describe a number of counter measures that must be taken to 
preserve the security of active metering against the potential attacks. The implemen-
*This work is published in: Y. Alkabani and F. Koushanfar, Active hardware metering for intel-
lectual property protection and security, in USENIX Security Symposium, pp. 291-306, 2007. 
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tation details of the method with the objectives of being low-overhead, unclonable, 
obfuscated, stable, while having a diverse set of keys is presented. The active meter-
ing method was implemented, synthesized and mapped on the standard benchmark 
circuits. Experimental evaluations illustrate that the method has a low-overhead in 
terms of power, delay, and area, while it is extremely resilient against the considered 
attacks. 
3.1 Introduction 
In the dominant horizontal semiconductor business model, piracy (illegal copying) 
and tampering of hardware are omnipresent. In the horizontal business model, hard-
ware Ipt designed by the leading edge designers are mostly manufactured in untrusted 
offshore countries with lower labor and operational cost. This places the designers 
in an unusual asymmetric relationship: the designed IP is transparent to the manu-
facturers, but the fabrication process, quantity and added circuitry to the manufac-
tured integrated circuits (ICs) by the foundry are clandestine to the designers and IP 
providers. 
The security threat, financial loss and economic impacts of hardware piracy which 
have received far less attention compared to software, is even more dramatic than 
software [22, 23]. Software piracy has received more attention compared to hardware 
also because it requires low-cost resources that are available to the general public. 
Protection of hardware is also crucially important because the ICs are pervasively 
used in almost all electronic devices and the potentially adversarial fabrication house 
has the full control over the hardware resources being manufactured. It is estimated 
tIn this paper, the term IP is used to refer to the integrated circuits design specifications that is 
available to the fabrication house. 
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that the computer hardware, corn.puter peripherals, and embedded systems are the 
dominant pirated IP components [22]. 
Several other issues make the IC protection problems truly challenging: (i) very 
little is known about the current and potential IC tampering attacks; (ii) numer-
ous attacking strategies exist, since tampering can be conducted at many levels of 
abstraction of the synthesis process; (iii) the most likely hardware adversaries are 
financially strong foundries and foreign governments with large economic resources 
and technological expertise; (iv) the adversary has full access to the structural spec-
ification of the design and most often also to the manufacturing test vectors; (v) 
the internal part of manufactured ICs are intrinsically opaque. While it is possible 
to tomographically scan an IC, the dense metal interconnect in 8 or more layers of 
modern manufacturing technology greatly reduce the effectiveness of such expensive 
inspections. 
IC metering is a set of security protocols that enable the design house to gain post-
fabrication control by passive or active count of the produced ICs, their properties 
and use, or by remote runtime disabling. 
Our strategic goal is the development, implementation, and quantitative evaluation 
of symmetric mechanisms and protocols for hardware protection procured by untrusted 
synthesis, manufacturing, and/or testing facilities. The term symmetric emphasizes 
that both the designers and the foundry will be protected by the new methods. The 
symmetry is warranted by the unique variabilities and the key exchange mechanism 
that is based on the agreement of both parties for unlocking each IC. 
Hardware metering is important from both commercial and military point of views. 
For example, without metering, a foundry can produce numerous copies of one design 
without paying royalties, or, as another example, the sensitive defense designs may 
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become available to adversaries. The passive hardware metering schemes work by 
giving a unique ID to each chip [24, 25, 26]. The first ever active hardware metering 
method introduced in this paper, provides not just mechanisms for detection of illegal 
copies, but more importantly, ensures that no manufactured Ie can be used without 
the explicit consent of the designer. 
The proposed methods employ two generic security mechanisms: (1) uniqueness 
of each Ie due to manufacturing variability; and (2) structural manipulation of the 
design specification while preserving behavioral specification. While the first mecha-
nism has been already proposed and used for unique Ie identification, the second is 
novel. Even more novel is the integration of two mechanisms, a task that requires 
a great deal of creativity and formation of solutions to a spectrum of challenging 
technology, synthesis and optimization problems, with a greater impact than the sum 
of the powers of the individual techniques. 
The integration to the functionality is performed by interwinding the unique un-
clonable IDs for each chip into the FSM of the design. The integrated control part 
is denoted by BFSM, and is built by adding new states and transitions to the orig-
inal FSM, while preserving the original functionality of the circuit. To bring the 
BFSM into the functional initial (reset) state, knowledge of the transition table is 
required. Since the designer is the only one who knows this information, no one else 
can generate a key with a finite amount of resources to unlock the Ie. Using a combi-
nation of BFSM and newly added black hole states, remote disabling of the Ies can 
be made possible. We outline several possible attacks against the introduced active 
hardware metering method and provide mechanisms that neutralize the impact of 
those attacks. For example, we show how addition of the black hole states disable 
the random guessing attacks. 
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The remainder of the paper is as follows. After describing the background, flow 
and the state-of-the-art in the next two sections, we represent the active metering 
method in Section 5.4. In Section 5.5, we show a low-overhead implementation 
and obfuscation of active metering. Section 5.6 introduces potential attacks and 
the counter measures that needs to be taken to be resilient against the attacks. We 
present experimental evaluation of the prototype implementation on several standard 
design benchmarks in Section 3.7. We outline a number of potential applications in 
Section 5.8 and conclude in Section 6.7. 
3.2 Preliminaries 
In this section, we describe the necessary background required for understanding the 
active hardware metering approach. The aim is to make the paper self-contained 
for the readers who are not familiar with the hardware design and synthesis process. 
Next, we describe the global flow of the active hardware metering approach. 
3.2.1 Background 
Manufacturing variability (MV). The intense industrial miniaturization of CMOS 
devices has been driven by the quest for increasing computational speed and device 
density, while lowering cost-per-function, as predicted by Moore's law. CMOS varia-
tions result in high variability in the delay and the currents of the VLSI circuits. The 
variations might be temporal or spatial. The temporal variations may occur across 
nanoseconds to years [27]. Spatial variation is due to lateral and vertical differences 
from intended polygon dimensions and film thicknesses. Spatial variation may be 
intra-die, or inter-die [28]. Aside from device variations, the circuit response and 
its variability are correlated with circuit topology. We will utilize the spatial varia-
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tions in our benefit, while we address the problem of alleviating temporal variability. 
Bernstein et al. provide a classification of device variations (beyond 65nm) [29]. 
Design descriptions. We consider the case in which the sequential design in ques-
tion represents a fully synchronous flow and that the description of its functionality 
from an input/output (I/O) perspective is publicly available. We assume that the 
functionality is fully fixed, in that the I/O behavior is fully specified. Therefore, we 
utilize unique unclonable identification to embed a distinct mark in the functionality 
of each Ie, without altering the functionality in terms of the normal I/O behavior of 
the circuit. Our technique is applicable to the case where the piece of IP is available 
in structural HDL description, or in form of a netlist that mayor may not be tech-
nology dependent. The description uniquely defines the sequential circuit's behavior 
and the state transition graph (see the next subsection) of the design. 
During the design flow, the user will take such a description and if required, will 
map it to a specific technology. Typically, logic level optimizations such as retiming 
are performed at this stage. Most often, the circuit is used as a part of a more complex 
design. 
Figure 3.1 : Example of a STG with five states.The inputs required for state-to-state 
transition are shown next to the edges. 
Finite state machine (FSM). FSM is a discrete dynamical structure that translates 
sequences of input vectors into sequences of output vectors. FSM can represent 
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any regular sequential function. It appears in different forms, e.g. case statements 
in VHDL and Verilog HDL. The FSM is defined by the tuple M=(E,D..,Q,qo,8,)..), 
where E # 0 and D.. # 0 are a finite set of inputs and outputs symbols respectively; 
Q={ qo,q}, . .. }# 0 is a finite set of states while qo is the "reset" state; and the transition 
function is denoted as 8(q, a) on the input a and the set Q x E -+ Q, while the output 
function is denoted as ).. (q, a) on the set Q x E -+ D... 
To represent the state transitions and output functions of the FSM, we use the 
state transition graph (STG), with nodes corresponding to states and edges defining 
the input/output conditions for a state-to-state transition. An example STG is shown 
in Figure 3.1, where there are five states {qo, q}, q2, q3, q4}, qo is the reset state, and 
there is a one-bit input controlling the state-to-state transitions. In the remainder of 
the paper, we use the terms STG and FSM interchangeably to refer to the control 
part of the design. 
3.2.2 Global flow 
As a motivational example for our problem, consider the scenario in which a given 
hardware intellectual property (IP) that belongs to its legitimate owner (Alice) is 
made available to a fabrication house (Bob). Alice pays for and demands N A ICs 
implementing its design. Bob, utilizes the IP description to construct a mask that 
implements the design. Bob employs the mask to make N A + N B copies of the 
design, where the illegal N B copies do not encounter much additional cost due to the 
availability of the mask. Bob may sell the N B illegal copies and make a lot of profit 
with negligible additional overhead. 
The novel active metering helps Alice to protect her design against piracy by 
manipulating the STG of the original design, with the objective of creating a locked 
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Alice Bob 
Figure 3.2 : The global flow of the active hardware metering approach. 
state, that is unique for each of the les manufactured from the design with a very high 
probability. Upon manufacturing by Bob, each device will be uniquely locked (i.e., 
rendered non-functional), unless Alice is contacted by Bob to provide the particular 
key to unlock the Ie. The scheme gives the full control over the manufactured parts 
and operational devices from the IP to Alice. 
The global flow of the active hardware metering method is shown in Figure 6.1. We 
now describe the figure step by step. Alice takes the high level design description and 
synthesizes it to get the FSM of the design. Next, she constructs the BFSM by adding 
extra states. After that, she sends the detailed manufacturable design specifications 
to Bob who makes the mask and manufactures multiple les implementing the design. 
The manufactured les are locked (nonfunctional) at this stage. For each Ie, Bob 
reads out the values in its flip flops (FFs) and sends the values to Alice. FF values 
can be read nondestructively, and the values are unique for each Ie. Alice, knowing 
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the BFSM structure, computes a specific key that can be used as input to that IC 
for unlocking it. The key is then sent back to Bob who utilizes it to activate the IC. 
3.3 Related work 
We survey the related literature that has influenced and inspired this work along four 
main lines of research: variability-based ID generation, authentication and security by 
variability-based IDs, intellectual property protection of VLSI designs, and invasive 
and noninvasive hardware attacks. 
A number of authors have proposed and implemented the idea of addition of 
circuitry that exploits manufacturing variability to generate unique random sequence 
(ID) for each chip with the same mask [24, 26, 30]. The IDs are unclonable and 
separated from the functionality and do not provide a measure of trust, as they are 
easy to tamper and remove. Loftstrom et al. proposed a method for mismatching 
the devices based on changing the threshold of the circuits by placing the impurity 
of random dopant atoms [24]. Maeda et al. proposed implementing the random 
IDs on poly-crystalline silicon thin film transistors [26]. The drawback of the two 
described approaches is that they both need specialized process technology, and are 
easily detectable. Very recently, Su et al. have proposed a technique to generate 
random IDs by using the threshold mismatches of two NOR gates that are positively 
feeding back each other [30]. We will exploit their technique for the random ID 
generation. 
A team of researchers has explored the idea of using variability-induced delays for 
authentication and security [31, 32, 33]. They use Physically Unclonable Functions 
(PUFs) that map a set of challenges to a set of responses, based on an intractably 
complex physical system. PUFs are unique, since process variations cause significant 
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delay differences among ICs coming from the same mask. For each IC, a database of 
challenge-response sets is needed. Authentication occurs when the IC correctly finds 
the output of one or more challenge inputs. PUF-based methods solely utilize manu-
facturing variability as their security mechanism. In contrast, our proposed methods 
introduce a paradigm shift in hardware security by adding new strong mechanisms: 
integration into circuit functionality at the behavioral synthesis level. Further more, 
even though the active metering methods can be utilized for authentication, its main 
target is addressing the hardware piracy problem. 
Koushanfar et al. have introduced the first hardware metering scheme that gives 
unique IDs to each IC [34]. The scheme was to make a small part of the design 
programmable so that one could upload different control paths post fabrication. They 
further described how to generate numerous different instances of the same control 
path with the same hardware [25]. They have also provided probabilistic proofs for the 
number of identical copies and probability of fraud for the proposed metering schemes 
[34, 25]. All metering schemes were passive. Indeed, no active metering scheme has 
been proposed to date. The prior work in trusted IC domain also includes introduction 
of several watermarking schemes that integrate watermarks to the functionality of the 
design at the behavioral synthesis level [35, 36, 37, 8, 38, 39, 40, 41]. Watermarking 
is a fundamentally different problem when compared to metering. It addresses the 
problem of uniquely identifying each IP and not identifying each Ie, so the existence 
of the same mask does not affect the watermarking results. Fingerprinting for unique 
identification of programmable platforms has been proposed [42], but the techniques 
are not applicable to application specific designs (ASICs) due to the existence of a 
unique mask. Qu and Potkonjak provide a comprehensive survey of the watermarking, 
fingerprinting and other hardware intellectual property protection methods [38]. 
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Even though many strong cryptographical techniques are available in hardware 
and software, their attack resiliency has been only verified by classical crypto-analysis 
methods. A class of attacks that is very challenging to address consists of physical 
techniques. Physical attacks take advantage of implementation-specific characteristics 
of cryptographical devices to recover the secret parameters. Koeune and Standaert 
provide a tutorial on physical security and side-channel effects [43]. The physical 
attacks are divided into invasive and noninvasive [44]. Invasive attacks depackage 
the chip to get direct access to its inside, e.g., probing. Noninvasive attacks rely on 
outside measurements, e.g., from the pins or by X-raying the chip, without physically 
tampering it. 
There are multiple ways to attack an Ie, including probing, fault injection, timing, 
power analysis, and electromagnetic analysis. Invasive attacks are typically more 
expensive than the noninvasive ones, since they need individual probing of each Ie. 
Note that, according to the well-established taxonomy of physical attacks, attacks by 
the funded organizations (e.g., foundries) are the most severe ones, since they have 
both the funding and technology resources [45, 46, 44]. 
3.4 Active hardware metering 
In this section, we present the details of the active hardware metering approach. Ac-
tive metering is integrated into the standard synthesis flow, and is low overhead, gener-
alizable, and resilient against attacks. By generalizable, we mean that the lock can be 
implemented on structures that are common to all designs. By attack-resiliency, we 
mean the cryptographic notion of a lock: that an attacker that does not have infinite 
computational power should not be able to unlock the Ie without the knowledge of 
a key. To be generalizable, the method proposed here aims at protecting the design 
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by boosting the design's FSM (and creating a BFSM) common to the widely used 
class of sequential designs. In this section, we describe the BFSM construction and 
introduce the locking mechanism. Implementation details are discussed in the next 
section. 
3.4.1 Method 
Random Unique Block (RUB). Perhaps the most important component of the 
proposed security mechanism is the existence of the unclonable unique ID for each 
IC. The IDs are a function of the variability present at each chip and are therefore, 
specific to the chip. RUB is a small circuitry added to the design, whose function is to 
generate the unique ID. It is desirable that the RUBs do not change and remain stable 
over time. Recently, a few paradigms for designing unique identification circuitry was 
proposed [24, 26, 30]. The resulting IDs are mostly stable, and we will later show how 
to extract a nonvolatile ID from the RUB, even in presence of a few unstable bits. 
Addition of the BFSM. The key idea underlying the proposed active metering 
scheme can be described in a simple way. Assume that the original design contains 
m distinct states. Further assume that the state of STG are stored in k, I-bit flip 
flops (FFs). The FFs represent a total of 2k states, out of which m states correspond 
to the original design and (2k - m) states are dont cares. The metering mechanism 
adds an extra part to the FSM of the design. The added states are devised such that 
there are a number of transitions from the states in the added STG to the reset state 
qo of the original design. 
In our scheme, the power-up state of each IC is built to be a function of the 
manufacturing variability and thus, will be unique to each instance. Furthermore, 
we select k such that 2k - m > > m. This selection ensures that when the circuit is 
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powered up, its initial state will be in one of the added states in BFSM. Assume that 
the Ie is powered up in the added state qaO. During the standard testing phase, the 
manufacturer can read the state ofthe design, e.g., by scanning and reading the FF's. 
However, unless the foundry has the knowledge of the STG, finding the sequence of 
inputs required for the correct transition from the state qaO to the reset state qo is a 
problem of exponential complexity. Essentially, there will be no way of finding the 
sequence other than trying all the possible combinations. 
More formally, assume that the sequence of I primary inputs denoted as aI={ al, 
a2, ... , aI} applied to the state qaO is one correct sequence of states that starts 
from qaO traverses I states denoted by QI={qab qa2, ... , qa(I-l),qO}, i.e., qo=8(qao, a). 
Assuming that the input is b bits and there are cycles in STG, finding the correct 
input sequence that would result in I consecutive correct transitions is a problem 
with exponential complexity with respect to b and is thus, intractable. 
As an example, consider the STG shown in Figure 3.3(b) that consists of the 
original STG that has five states ({ qO,qI,q2,q3,q4}) with augmentation of twenty seven 
added states ({ q5 ,q6, . .. ,q3d)· Edges are incorporated to the added states to ensure 
that there are paths from each of the added states to the reset state of the design. 
The block shown in Figure 3.3(a) is a RUB. 
The output of the RUB defines k random bits that will be loaded into the FF's of 
the augmented STG upon start-up. Now, an uninformed user who does not have the 
information about the transition table (e.g., foundry), can readout the data about the 
initial added state qaO, but this information is not sufficient for finding the sequence of 
primary input combinations to arrive at the reset state qo. However, the person who 
has the information about the structure of the STG, upon receiving the correct state, 
would exactly know how to traverse from this locked state to qo. In other words, the 
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(a) RUB initially loading the STG's FFs 
(b) The original and enhanced STG 
Figure 3.3: The boosted FSM (BFSM). 
owner of the FSM description is the only entity who would have the key to unlock 
the IC. 
An interesting application of the proposed BFSM construction method is in re-
mote disabling. Alice will save the RUBs and the keys for all the ICs that she has 
unlocked. Using the chip IDs that are integrated within the functionality, she can add 
mechanisms that enable her to monitor the activities of the registered chips remotely, 
for example, if they are connected to the Internet. She can further add transitions 
from the original STG to untraversed states, to lock the IC in case it is needed. Re-
mote disabling has a lot of applications. For example, it can be used for selective 
remote programming of the devices, and royalty enforcement. 
3.4.2 Ensuring proper operation 
The following issues and observations ensure proper operation and low-overhead of 
active hw metering: 
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(i) Storing the input sequence (key) for traversal to the initial state qo· 
During testing, once Bob scans out the FF values and sends them to Alice, she 
provides the key to Bob. He includes both the original RUB and the key in the chip, 
for example, in a nonvolatile memory. This data is utilized along with the unclonable 
RUB circuit, for transition to the reset state. Since the power-up state is unique for 
each IC, sequence of inputs (key) that traverse the power-up state to the reset state is 
also specific to each IC. One needs to store the key which performs the traversal at the 
power-up state on each chip. There are many ways to accomplish this. For example, 
the designer could add a small programmable part to the design which needs to be 
coded with the unique sequence (key) before each IC is in operation. Coding ensures 
protection of keys against other software attacks. As an alternative, the sequence 
might not be included in the memory and just used as a permanent password to the 
IC. 
(ii) Powering up in one of the added states. This condition can be easily 
guaranteed by selecting a large enough k. Assuming that all the states have an equal 
probability, the probability of starting in one of the added states is (2k - m) 12k. For 
a given m, we select k such that the probability of not being in one of the added 
states is smaller than a given probability. For example, for m = 100 and k = 30, the 
probability of starting up in an original state is less than 10-7 . 
(iii) Diversity of power-up states (unique IDs). k should also be selected so 
that the probability of two ICs having the same ID becomes very low. Assume that 
we need to have d distinct ICs each with a unique ID. Assuming that the IDs are 
completely random and independent, we utilize the Birthday paradox to calculate 
this probability and to make it low. Consider the probability PIC1D(k, d) that no two 
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ICs out of a group of d will have matching IDs out of 2k equally possible IDs. Start 
with an arbitrary chip's ID. The probability that the second chip's ID is different is 
(2k -1)/2k. Similarly, the probability that the third IC's ID is different from the first 
two is [(2k - 1)/2k].[(2k - 2)/2k]. The same computation can be extended through 
the 2k-th ID. More formally, 
PICID(k, d) 2k -12k - 2 2k . 2k 
2k! (3.1) 
Thus, knowing d, the number of required distinct copies, and setting a low value for 
PIC/ D , we would be able to find k that satisfies the above equation. 
(iv) Overhead of the added STG. The number of states increases exponentially 
with adding each new bit, and thus, the scheme has a very low overhead. Note that, in 
modern designs, the control path of the design (i.e., FSM) is less than 1% of the total 
area and hence, adding a small overhead to the FSM does not significantly affect the 
total area [47, 1]. In the next section, we will describe a low-overhead implementation 
of the proposed method. 
(v) Diversity of keys. There is a need to ensure that the keys are distinct in all 
parts of their sequences, or there is a very small shared subsequence between different 
keys. This is granted by making multiple paths on the graph from each of the states 
to the reset state. We will elaborate more on this issue in the attack resiliency section. 
3.5 Low overhead implementation and obfuscation 
In this section, we discuss the implementation details of the RUB and the BFSM 
that are the required building blocks for the active hardware metering approach. We 
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start by outlining the desired properties of each block, and then we delve into its 
implementation details. 
3.5.1 RUB implementation 
A critical aspect of the proposed security and protection mechanisms is the generation 
of random ID bits. There are a number of properties that the RUB implementation 
has to satisfy, including: 
• Low overhead. The added parts must not introduce a significant additional 
overhead in terms of delay, power consumption and the area. 
• Distribution of IDs and their correlations. To have the maximal difference 
between any two ID numbers (the maximal Hamming distances) the ID bits must be 
completely random. Thus, no correlation must be present among the ID bits on the 
same die or across various dies. 
• Indiscernibility. The IDs must be integrated within the design, such that they 
cannot be discerned by studying the layout of the circuit. For example, the IDs 
should not be placed in a memory-like array, where the regularity of the array and 
its connections to the FFs could be easily detected. 
• Stability. There is a need to stabilize the IDs over the lifetime of an IC. This 
is particularly important since studies have shown the temporal changes in CMOS 
process variations due to many environmental and aging effects including, residual 
charges, self-heating, negative-bias temperature instability, and hot electron effects 
[29]. 
For implementing the random IDs, we employed the recent novel approach pro-
posed by Su et al. [30]. They have designed and tested a new CMOS random ID 
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generation circuit that relies on digital latch threshold offset voltages. Using cross 
coupling of gates, they report significant improvement in readout speed and power 
consumption over the existing designs. 
Each ID bit is generated by cross-coupled NOR gates. The latch sides are pulled 
low initially. At the high to low clock transition, the state of each latch is determined 
by the threshold voltage mismatch of the transistors. Essentially, the approach relies 
on the positive feedback inherent in the latch configuration to amplify the mismatch. 
This design removes the need for comparators, low offset amplifiers, or extra dopants 
needed in previous random ID generation methods [24, 31]. The nominal overhead of 
the above proposed approach is two NOR gates per bit. The authors have reported 
96% stable IDs using this method, while using dummy latches to protect the IDs. 
Even though we use the random bit architecture described above, our layout and 
implementation of random bits are very different. To be indiscernible, we do not 
place the coupled NOR gates in an array, and instead synthesize them with the rest 
of the circuit and camouflage them within the sea of gates. based on invariability of 
the ID bits for an Ie. In Subsection 3.6.2, we provide a mechanism that ensures the 
occasional errors in ID bits do not affect the hardware metering approach. 
3.5.2 BFSM implementation 
The key design objectives and challenges of the BFSM are as follows: 
• Low overhead. The addition of the states to the original FSM must have a low 
overhead in terms of area, power, and delay. This is particularly challenging: as we 
have computed in Subsection 3.4.2, even under the assumption of having RUBs with 
Uniform distribution of random bits, the number of added states must be exponen-
tially high to ensure a proper operation. 
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• Traversal path. There must be a path on the BFSM, from each of the power-up 
states (except for the black hole states that we will describe in Section 3.6.2) to the 
reset state. 
• States obfuscation. The states must be completely obfuscated and interchanged 
to camouflage the added STG and the original STG. Another level of obfuscation is 
disabling the observability of the FFs, so that similar states on two ICs do not exactly 
have the same code scanned out from their FFs. 
• Multiplicity of keys. It is highly desirable to construct the paths on the added 
STG in such a way that there are multiple paths from each power-up state to the reset 
state. This will ensure that there are multiple keys for traversal. Now, if the states 
are obfuscated such that a similar state on two ICs has different codes, and each of 
them gets a different key for traversal to the original STG, the state similarities will 
not be apparent, even to a smart observer. 
To achieve a low overhead, we have systematically designed STG blocks that are 
capable of producing an exponential number of states with respect to their underlying 
hardware resources. The blocks are designed such that there are multiple paths from 
each of the added states to the reset state and thus, the mUltiplicity of the keys is 
satisfied. Our first attempt was to synthesize the added blocks of STG and the original 
STG together. However, because the synthesis software automatically optimizes the 
interwoven architecture, it most often ended up with a combined STG that was 
much larger than the sum of its components. Thus, we decided to first separately 
synthesize the original and the added STG before we merge them. Next, we employed 
obfuscation methods that constantly alter the values of the FFs, even those that are 
not used in state assignment in the current STG. As we will see in attack resiliency 
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section, the introduced obfuscation method has the side-benefit that the adversary 
cannot exactly distinguish a similar state on two different les. 
The added STG can be designed to be low overhead; there are exponentially many 
states for each added FF, ignoring the overhead of the STG edges. However, in real 
situations, the transitions (edges) require logic. Thus, the added STG is constrained 
to be sparse to satisfy a low overhead. We have built this block in a modular way. 
We describe one of our modules here and then discuss systematically interconnecting 
the modules to have a multi-bit added STG that has a low overhead. 
(a) Ring counter (b) Reconnecting a state (e) Adding a few edges 
Figure 3.4 : Illustration of steps for building a sparse 3-bit STG. 
The first module is a 3-bit added STG. In Figure 3.4, we show three steps for 
building this module. We start by a ring counter as shown in Graph 3.4(a). Next, 
we pick a few states and reconnect them to break the regularity. A small example 
is illustrated in Graph 3.4(b), where the state ql is reconnected, such that still there 
will be a path from each state to any other state. Finally, we add a few transitions 
(edges) to the STG, like the example shown in Graph 3.4(c); here the states ql and 
q4 are reconnected, while the edges { q4 ~ ql, q7 ~ q3, q7 ~ q7, q2 ~ q2 } are added. 
The example is just an illustration. Many other configurations are possible. 
The various combinations have different post-synthesis overhead. To ensure a low-
overhead, we exhaustively searched the synthesized 3-bit structure with various sparse 
edge configurations like the example above, and selected the configurations with the 
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lowest overhead as our 3-bit modules. As it is apparent from the structure, many 
low-overhead configurations are possible and we do not need to use the same module 
multiple times. 
After that, we picked the low overhead modules and started to add edges to inter-
connect them, such that the connectivity property is satisfied, and the interconnected 
configuration still has low overhead. Furthermore, we need multiple interconnecting 
paths that can produce multiple keys. This is again done via a modular randomized 
edge addition and searching the space of the synthesized circuits to find the best 
multi-bit configurations. Note that, the synthesis program performs state-encoding 
for the interconnected modules. We have noticed that the distance of the codes as-
signed to the states does not have a correlation with the proximity of the states. 
Therefore, even for two RUBs that are only different in I-bit, typically the power-up 
states are not close-by on the added STG. 
In our experiment, we have tested our approach on 12, 15, and IS-bit added 
STGs. Now, the original STG has to be glued to the added part. This is done by 
an obfuscation scheme that ensures the states of FFs that are associated with the 
original STG keep pseudorandomly changing, even when we traverse the states of the 
added STGs. Thus, for an observer who studies the values of the interleaved FFs, 
the activity study would not yield an informative conclusion that can help separating 
the original and the added states. A simple example for this obfuscation is depicted 
in Figure 3.5. In this figure, a small original STG with five states is presented. The 
cloud shown below the original STG indicates the added states. 
There are multiple state transitions from the added states to the original state. 
However, we only show one arrow on the plot not to make it more crowded. In this 
example, we use the three don't cares of the design for obfuscation purposes. There 
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Figure 3.5 : Obfuscation of the original STG. 
are 3 don't care states that we use to form three new dummy states q*5, q*6, and 
Q*7, illustrated in grey color. The glue logic attaches the inputs and the states of the 
added STG to the dummy STG. Thus, by carefully designing, one can alter the bits 
on the dummy STG by changing the input and the states of the added STG without 
touching the original FSM. If the design does not have sufficient don't cares, we can 
add a couple of FFs for the dummy states and use the same paradigm. The important 
requirement for the dummy states is that as a group they should present both 1 and 
o digits in all FFs. The original STG is also connected to the dummy STG and can 
utilize it as a black hole (described more thoroughly in Subsection 3.6.2), if there is 
a need to halt the Ie. 
3.6 Attack resiliency 
This section first identifies several types of potential attacks on the active hardware 
metering approach. Next, we outline a number of mechanisms that must be added to 
the basic active metering scheme to ensure its resiliency against the suggested attacks. 
The adversary (Bob) may attempt to perform a set of invasive or noninvasive 
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attacks on the proposed active metering scheme. Bob may do so by measuring and 
probing one instance, or by statistically studying a collection of instances. In this 
section, we first identify and describe the attacks. Next, we propose efficient counter 
measures that can be taken to neutralize the effect of potential adversarial acts. 
We assume that Bob knows all the concepts of the proposed hardware metering 
scheme, has the complete knowledge of the design at all levels of abstraction provided 
to the foundry (e.g., logic synthesis level net list , and physical design GDS-II file, 
but no behavioral specification), can simultaneously observe all signals (data) on 
all interconnects and flip-flops (FFs) , and can measure, with no error, all timing 
characteristics of all gates in the ICs. 
3.6.1 Description of attacks 
The starting point for development and evaluation of the metering schemes is identi-
fication and specification of several types of potential attacks: 
(i) Brute-force attack. Bob aims to place the pertinent IC into the initial state by 
systematically applying the input sequences to the BFSM. The systematic application 
may be a randomized strategy, or may be based on scanning the FFs. Brute-force 
attack works by randomly changing the inputs in hope of arriving at the reset state. 
Scanning works by reading out the FF values for a few ICs and storing them. The 
FFs in the current IC are then monitored for the existence of a common state with 
the stored ones. In case a state that was read in the previous ICs is reached, Bob 
uses the same key for traversal to the reset state. 
(ii) Reverse engineering of FSM. Bob may try to scan the FFs to extract the 
STG. The attempt would be to remove the added STG from the BFSM, to separate 
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the original and the added states. 
(iii) Combinational redundancy removal. Bob may use the combinational re-
dundancy removal, a procedure that attempts to remove the combinational logic that 
is not necessary for the correct behavior of the circuit. The proposed techniques of 
this class often take into account the set of reachable states of the FSM under ex-
amination [48]. Note that, the attacks that were described so far can greatly benefit 
from the ability to simultaneously monitor the multitude of signals/values on the IC 
using laser reading. 
(iv) RUB emulation. The goal of this attack is to create a reconfigurable imple-
mentation capable of realizing hardware that has the identical functional and timing 
characteristics to a RUB for which a legal key is already received. 
(v) Initial power-up state capturing and replaying (CAR). Bob knows the 
initial power-up state of an unlocked IC. He can use invasive methods to load the 
FFs of other ICs to the same power-up state as the unlocked IC and then utilize the 
same key to decode the new locks. Note that, unless invasive methods are used, the 
only way for Bob to alter the values in the FFs is to change the states using the 
input pins. Without the knowledge of the STG, the change of state can only be done 
as described in the first attack. This attack and the next two belong to the class of 
replay attacks. 
(vi) Initial reset state CAR. Bob scans the FF of an unlocked IC and reads the 
code of the reset state. Next, he employs invasive methods to load the FFs of other 
ICs to unlock them. 
(vii) Control signals CAR. In this attack, Bob attempts to bypass the FSM by 
learning the control signals and attempting to emulate them. Bob may completely 
54 
bypass FSM by creating a new FSM that provides control signals to all functional 
units, and control logic (e.g. MUX's and FFs) in the datapath. 
(viii) Creation ofidentical ICs using selective IC release. Bob only releases the 
ICs with similar characteristics to Alice in the hope of finding the keys by correlations. 
This attack is probably the most expensive because it involves only a small percentage 
of manufactured ICs by the untrusted foundry. Only the ICs that have similar RUBs 
are reported. Hence, if the attack is successful, the design house supplies many keys 
for ICs with similar RUBs; the birthday paradox shows that one of the keys with 
relatively high likelihood can be used on the unreported ICs. Note that, the way 
for Bob to determine closeness of characteristics is by looking at the distances of the 
initial power-up states. 
(ix) Differential FF activity measurement. Bob may start to investigate the 
differential activities of the FFs of the unlocked designs for the same input, and then 
try to eliminate the FFs that have different values. 
3.6.2 Counter measures 
We propose a number of mechanisms to augment the basic active metering scheme and 
preserve its security against the above attacks. Two important observations are that 
FSMs in modern industrial design are always a very small part the overall design, well 
below 1%, and that STG recovery is a computationally intractable problem [47, 1, 8J: 
• Creating black holes FSMs. Alice may create a black holes FSM inside the 
BFSM that makes the exit impossible. Black holes are the states that cannot be exited 
regardless of the used input sequence. Their design is very simple as shown in Figure 
3.6, where the black states do not have a route back to the other states. Furthermore, 
I Added I STG 
Figure 3.6 : Example of a black hole FSM. 
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a designer can plan the black hole states to be permanent if it is desirable: a small 
part may be added, so that restarting the IC would not take it out of the black hole 
states. This measure essentially eliminates the effectiveness of the first two attacks, 
because no random input sequence leads to the initial state of the functional FSM: 
once the black hole sub-FSM is entered, there is no way out. A special case is creation 
of trapdoor black (gray) holes FSMs that are designed in such a way that only long 
specific sequence of input signals known just to the designer can bring control out of 
this FSM and into the initial functional state of the overall FSM. An issue that needs 
to be carefully addressed here is preventing the IC from powering-up in one of the 
black-hole states. This can be easily ensured by adding extra logic to the black hole 
parts that would disconnect the black hole states from the power-up states. 
• Merging the functional BFSM with the test and other FSMs, (e.g. ones 
that can be used for debugging and authentication). In a typical design, the functional 
control circuits are not the only FSMs around. Alice, with the the objective to make 
identification of her functional FSM more difficult, can further intricate the BFSM 
by co-synthesizing them with others. This augmentation makes the first two and 
the three CAR attacks less effective. In particular, this merger would distract the 
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ability to simultaneously monitor the multitude of signals/values on the IC using laser 
reading. 
• Similar FF activity for the unlocked ICs. The designs would be made such 
that once an IC exits the locked states and is in its functional states, all its FFs have a 
deterministic behavior that is the same for all ICs. Thus, the differential FF activity 
screening would not yield any useful information. 
• Creation of specialized functional FSMs (SFFSMs). Alice can make the 
security much tighter by integrating the RUBs not just to assign the initial power-
up state, but to alter the structure of the BFSM and make it a SFFSM. Using this 
method, the reset state for FSM of each IC is a function of its RUB. Each SFFSM 
operates correctly only if it received a specific stream of signals from the RUBs. Since 
there are exponentially many states with respect to the number of FFs in FSM, we 
map a set of blocks that share an identical subset of RUB outputs into a single 
SFFSM. This counter measure makes the first two attacks (i.e., brute-force attack 
and FSM reverse engineering) much more difficult and the first two CAR attacks 
(i.e., initial control signal CAR and initial reset state CAR) almost impossible. 
A simple example of this method is presented in Figure 3.7. On this figure, the 
added STG is shown by the cloud on left, and the original STG is plotted in the 
right cloud. The original STG has only 3 states: a reset state two other states. Here, 
the original STG is replicated twice: One replication is denoted by SFFSM' and the 
other one is denoted by SFFSM". The scheme adds logic to the added STG, so based 
on the bits in the RUB, it will be categorized into three classes. Each of the classes 
will transition to one of the reset states in one of the clouds: original FSM, SFFSM' 
or SFFSM". This scheme will cause confusion in FFs scanning methods that aim 
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at loading the reset state of an unlocked IC in the FFs of a locked chip. Note that, 
the replicated states need not all be unique, and maybe shared among the replicas to 
reduce the overhead. 
Figure 3.7 : A simplified SFFSM. 
The example is very small, but one can add the RUB-dependent states at various 
stages to ensure that the attacker is not able to break the system. A combination 
of the SFFSM method and the state obfuscation and encoding would ensure a full 
security of the design against the CAR attacks. Furthermore, using similar methods, 
the RUBs can be also added to the obfuscation scheme based on the dummy variables 
like the example presented in Figure 3.5, so that the same inputs would have different 
random obfuscation patterns. 
Another use of SFFSM is for addressing the effect of temporal changes in RUB. 
Recall that the actual application of the new hardware metering scheme to industrial 
designs requires mechanisms that ensure resiliency against time-dependent perma-
nent changes of transistors as well as gate-level and transient changes due to the 
environmental conditions such as temperature and supply voltage fluctuations [29J. 
The exact reconstruction of the first power-up state of Ie (the particular one for 
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which the designer released the key) for the purpose of defeating the variabilities is 
trivial: Bob can just load the captured and saved outputs of the first power-up RUB 
for which he has obtained the key. This mechanism makes the design susceptible to 
reuse attacks, where Bob can reuse the key and the initial RUB for an unlocked IC 
to decipher another locked IC. However, if Alice included SFFSM in her design, she 
would be resilient against this attack. The only technical issue that remains to be 
addressed is to ensure that the SFFSM receives the correct data from the physical 
RUB, exactly the same as the one that was first received and for which the key is 
available. Otherwise, the stored key will fail. 
In presence of temporal variations, ensuring that each SFFSM receives the cor-
rect data from RUB requires error-correction mechanisms. One solution is to employ 
standard error-correction codes (ECCs). An alternative hardware solution that en-
counters a lower overhead compared to ECC is to create the specifications of each 
SFFSM in such a way that it transitions into the correct next states, even when one or 
up to a specified number of the inputs from the RUB are altered by the environmen-
tal conditions. Using the hamming distances of the RUBs, we can group them into 
similar SFFSMs and synthesize the results such that the error correction mechanisms 
are inherently present. This mechanism is particularly effective for longer RUBs that 
are required for present industrial designs. Note that, because the minterms for the 
combinational logic that implements transitions are now not smaller than for non-
resilient versions of the SFFSM, the hardware overhead is often zero or negative at 
the expense ofthe lower resiliency against brute force attacks [49]. However, since the 
probability of brute force attack can be made arbitrarily small with very low overhead 
(i.e., by using the black holes), this is a favorable trade-off. 
• Resiliency against combinational redundancy removal. To overcome this 
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attack, Alice must ensure the inapplicability of the attack to typical large circuits 
and the capability of this method to remove the added states. In general, computing 
a set of reachable states, can only be done for relatively small circuits, even when 
the implicit enumeration techniques are used. Thus, the method is only applicable 
to small circuits of small sizes. 
• Statistical characterization of gates. Alice can go one step further and at-
tempt to derive the gate-level characteristics of the manufactured ICs by measuring 
the input/output signals and exploiting the controllability and observability into the 
design. Essentially, knowing the circuit diagram, she would be able to write a linear 
systems of equations that can be solved for obtaining the approximate gate-level delay 
and power characteristics of the gates. She may even go further to use the extracted 
data to find the distribution of variations across the different chips (e.g., by using 
methods such as expectation maximization(EM)). Now, if the variations do not have 
enough fluctuations, then she will get suspicious and can halt the unlocking. This 
computation would ensure that the selective IC release would not be successful. 
• Obfuscation of state activities and encodings. The implementation of the 
BFSM presented in the previous section renders it impossible to tell the difference 
between the original FSM FFs and the added states FFs. This is because all of the 
FFs are changing all the time. Therefore, even though two states of BFSM in two 
Ies might be identical, the attacks based on scanning the FFs would not notice that, 
since a subset of the bits will be different. In other word, the FFs not used in the 
added FSM are randomly changing. Another obfuscation method that has already 
been implemented is that the states in the added STG are not in order and are coded 
out of sequence by the synthesis tool. Thus, even though there might be a direct 
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transition (edge) between two states, the methods based on FFs readings would not 
notice the proximity of the two states, since there code words are distant from each 
other. 
Note that, the attacks that were described earlier, even the ones that are compu-
tationally very expensive, will not be able to unlock the ICs, if the counter measures 
described above are in place. 
3.7 Experimental evaluations 
To test the applicability of the method described earlier, we implemented the active 
hardware metering on standard benchmark designs. In this section, we present the 
experimental setup, followed by the overhead of implementing BFSM on the consid-
ered benchmarks. After that, we show quantitative analysis of the effectiveness of the 
brute force attacks. We further show how the addition of black holes can make the 
scheme resilient against this attack with a minimal overhead. Note that, many of the 
attacks described earlier are assuming structural counter measures that are hard to 
quantify and evaluate. 
3.7.1 Experiment setup 
We used extended set of sequential benchmarks from the ISCAS'89 to evaluate the 
impact of the active hardware metering method [50]. Even though the ISCAS'89 
benchmarks are the latest comprehensive set of the gate-level designs, they are dated 
compared to the complex circuits in design, production and use today. Recall that 
following the Moore's law, the size and complexity of the circuits doubles approxi-
matelyevery 18 months. We use the larger benchmarks from the set, and we project 
the results to more complex circuits. Our projections show that the power, area, and 
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delay overheads diminish as we increase the size and complexity. Simultaneously, the 
locking complexity and resiliency against the attacks exponentially improves, due the 
multiplicity of states. We synthesize the benchmarks using the Berkeley SIS tool [51], 
that given a STG or a logic-level description of a sequential circuit produces an op-
timized netlist in the target technology (cell library) while preserving the sequential 
input-output behavior. We have written a C program that modifies the benchmarks 
by adding the extra states. The program calls SIS to obtain the specifications of the 
synthesized and mapped original and modified STGs. When evaluating the overhead 
results, the important observation is that FSMs (i.e., the control circuitry) in modern 
industrial design are always a very small part of the overall design, well bellow 1% 
[47, 1]. Thus, even doubling the overhead, will have a minimal impact on the overall 
circuit that is mostly occupied by memory, testing pins, and data path circuitry. 
3.7.2 Overhead of active hardware metering 
Our first set of experiments study the overhead of the introduced scheme in terms of 
area, power, and delay. It is worth noting here that our ultimate goal is to integrate 
the active hardware metering method in the design flow. Thus we have considered 
testing the approach on manufactured ICs. However, the prohibitive cost of manufac-
turing a circuit in aggressive technologies (the quote we got for fabricating a circuit in 
65nm was $500K) limits our experiments to synthesizing the benchmarks. Table 3.1 
presents the results for the area overhead. Because of the relatively small size of the 
circuits, we added STGs with 12 FFs and 15 FFs overhead to the original STGs. 
The first column shows the name of the circuit from the ISCAS'89 benchmark. The 
second column shows the number of inputs to the circuit. The third column shows 
the number of outputs to the circuits. Both the number of inputs and the number 
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Original Details 12 FFs 15 FFs 
Circuit In lOut FFs Area Area % Area % 
s27 4 1 3 18 224 11.44 278 14.44 
s298 3 6 14 244 454 0.86 508 1.08 
s344 9 11 15 269 480 0.78 534 0.99 
s444 3 6 21 352 554 0.57 609 0.73 
s526 3 6 21 445 648 0.46 702 0.58 
s641 35 23 17 539 743 0.38 797 0.48 
s713 35 23 17 591 793 0.34 847 0.43 
s953 16 23 29 743 947 0.27 1001 0.35 
s832 18 19 5 769 971 0.26 1025 0.33 
s1238 14 14 18 1041 1264 0.21 1318 0.27 
s1423 17 5 74 1164 1382 0.19 1436 0.23 
s9234 36 39 135 7971 8174 0.03 8228 0.03 
s13207 31 121 453 11248 11450 0.02 11504 0.02 
s38417 28 106 1463 32246 32448 0.01 32502 0.01 
Table 3.1 : Area overhead of active metering for various benchmarks. 
of outputs do not change after adding the extra states. The fourth column shows 
the number of FFs in the original circuit. The fifth column shows the area of the 
original circuit. Then we show both the new area and the percentage overhead after 
adding 12 FFs and 15 FFs for the extra states. It can be seen that the percentage 
area overhead is decreasing as the circuit size increases. Thus, for larger circuit sizes, 
the area overhead will be even less insignificant. 
Table 3.2 shows the delay and power overheads. The first column contains the 
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Original Datall. 12 FF. 15 FF8 
Circuit Dalay Power Dalay I % Power I % Delay 1 % Power 1 % 
827 6.60 134.00 14.40 1.18 1418.70 9.59 14.40 1.18 1696.70 11.66 
8298 15.00 1167.20 15.00 0.00 2468.60 1.11 15.00 0.00 2746.60 1.35 
.344 27.00 1030.00 27.00 0.00 2325.90 1.26 27.00 0.00 2603.90 1.53 
&444 17.60 1550.80 17.60 0.00 2815.20 0.82 17.60 0.00 3152.30 1.03 
.526 15.20 2065.70 15.20 0.00 3334.30 0.61 15.20 0.00 3664.70 0.77 
8641 97.60 1560.60 97.60 0.00 2832.10 0.81 97.60 0.00 3162.40 1.03 
8713 100.00 1670.70 100.00 0.00 2935.00 0.76 100.00 0.00 3265.40 0.95 
.953 23.60 1816.50 23.60 0.00 3084.20 0.70 23.60 0.00 3414.60 0.88 
8832 28.80 2849.60 28.80 0.00 4114.00 0.44 28.80 0.00 4444.40 0.56 
81238 34.40 2709.40 34.40 0.00 4034.00 0.49 34.40 0.00 4312.00 0.59 
81423 92.40 4882.70 92.40 0.00 6226.30 0.28 92.40 0.00 6504.30 0.33 
85378 32.20 12459.40 32.20 0.00 13515.00 0.08 32.20 0.00 14057.50 0.13 
.9234 75.80 19385.50 75.80 0.00 20653.30 0.07 75.80 0.00 20983.70 0.08 
.13207 85.60 37874.00 85.60 0.00 39138.40 0.03 85.60 0.00 39402.00 0.04 
838417 69.40 112706.80 69.40 0.00 113869.00 0.01 69.40 0.00 114147.00 0.01 
Table 3.2 : Delay and power overhead of active metering for various benchmarks. 
benchmark names. The second and third columns show the delay and power estimates 
of the original circuits. These are followed by both the delay and the percentage delay 
overhead, and the power and the percentage power overhead for adding both 12 FFs 
and 15 FFs STGs respectively. The delay overheads are universally small. With the 
exception of s27 that is too small to be considered practical, it is interesting to see that 
even other small benchmarks encountered no delay overhead after the addition of the 
new STG. For the small benchmarks that are not realistic compared to the current 
complex designs, the power increases significantly. As the circuit size increases, the 
percentage power overhead decreases. 
Next, we make a small model of the percentage of area and power overhead versus 
size of the circuit to extrapolate to more complex designs. The size of the added STG 
is fixed to 15 FFs. Figures 3.8{a) and 3.8{b) show the overhead data vs. size along 
with the fitted polynomial models, for power and area respectively. The plots suggest 
that as the circuit size increases, the percentage of power and area overheads both 
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Figure 3.8 : Percentage of (a) power; and (b) area; overheads vs. size after adding al 
5 FFs STG. 
decrease. Note that, for more complex designs, it is required to add significantly more 
than 15 FFs. Even if adding a STG with 100 FFs would add six times the overhead 
of the 15 FFs case in absolute terms, the overhead would be negligible, while there 
will be 285 extra states added to the design. Thus, for current and future circuit 
technologies, the BFSM would have a minimal impact on the performance in terms 
of power, area, and delay (i.e., it will most likely stay less than 1% of the overall 
design). 
3.7.3 Resiliency against the brute force attack 
Most of the attacks described in Section 5.6 can be encountered by devising intelligent 
design strategies, as described in Subsection 3.6.2. The only attack that we quan-
titatively study here is the brute force attack. We model this attack by randomly 
guessing the values on the graph until arriving at the functional reset state of the 
original FSM. 
We simulated the brute force attack on BFSMs with 12, 15, and 18 FFs, varying 
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II 3 
Number of inputs 
4 I 5 I 6 I 7 8 bits 
12 74385 82708 78939 83156 77028 82490 
15 560976 610373 602157 557776 592681 596260 
18 933680 932501 938583 918312 N/R N/R 
12 + bh 998000 999000 N/R N/R N/R N/R 
15 + bh N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R 
12 + 2 bh N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R 
12 + 2 bh N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R 
Table 3.3 : Average number of attempts needed for the brute force attack to unlock 
the added STG. 
the inputs from 3 to 8. In this experiment, we set an upper bound of 1,000,000 guesses; 
if the reset state is not reached after this many trials, the original STG is considered 
unreachable (denoted by N/R) and the brute force attack is reported unsuccessful. 
Table 3.3 shows the average number of guesses needed to unlock the BFSM over 
a 10,000 simulation runs. The first three rows show added STGs with 12, 15, and 
18 FFs respectively. The next two rows show the results for STGs with 12 and 15 
FFs, after adding 1 and 2 black holes respectively. Although the number of inputs 
does not affect the overhead, it impacts the resiliency against the brute force attack: 
the table illustrates that the brute force attacks are less successful if we use more 
than 3 different inputs. Also, as the size of the added STG increases, more guesses 
are necessary to unlock the circuit. By adding one black hole to the smaller FSMs, 
they perform better than the larger FSMs. Adding one or two black holes makes 
the original STG unreachable for the brute force attack. It is worth noting here that 
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STGs with 12 and 15 FFs are really small, as they have a total of 4,096 and 32,768 
states respectively. If the active metering scheme was to be implemented on current 
industrial strength designs, the added circuit would have at least a 100 FFs that 
would create 2100 I'V 1030 states. It would be impossible for a brute force attack to 
find a key. Furthermore, addition of a few black holes will further make the system 
resilient against the brute force attack. 
Table 3.4 shows area and power overheads for adding a black hole with 2 states 
to added STGs with 12 and 15 FFs respectively. The overhead of adding a black 
hole does not exceed 5% even for very small benchmarks. For larger circuits it is 
unnoticeable. Note that, we often add more than one black hole to the design, to 
warrant the impossibility of the brute force attacks. 
To evaluate the diversity of keys, we studied the number of cycles in the added 
STGs. For this STG, we form a new graph STG*, that has the same nodes as STG, 
but reverses the edges. Note that, simultaneously reversing all the edges will not 
affect the number of cycles in the graph. Since each state on STG has a path to 
the reset state, the directed acyclic graph (DAG) rooted at the original reset state in 
STG* will have a path to all states. We find a DAG of STG* by using the Dijkstra's 
shortest path algorithm. Next, we add the STG* edges to the DAG and see if they 
form a cycle and combine the cycles into one node; we iteratively continue until the 
cycles are gone. This approximate method is used to count the number of cycles. 
Using the method, we roughly guess that the STG with 12 FFs had more than 40 
cycles that enables the use to build exponentially many keys for traversal from a 
certain state. The large number of keys can be easily generated by a combination of 
cycling and switching between the cycles of the STG. 
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12 FF8 15 FF8 
Circuit % Area % Power % Area % Power 
827 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 
8298 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
8344 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 
8444 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 
8526 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
8641 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
8713 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
8953 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
8832 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 
81238 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
81423 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
85378 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
89234 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
813207 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
838417 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Table 3.4 : Percentage of area and power overheads after adding one blackhole. 
3.8 Potential applications 
Active hardware metering provides strong anti-piracy mechanisms for hardware IP 
cores as well as remote-disabling mechanisms for the manufactured parts. Remote 
disabling can be accomplished if a malicious activity is detected. For example, a 
designer can add an extra part to the circuit that detects say, the brute force attack 
where too many invalid inputs are being entered. As another example, the strange 
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activity patterns of the chip may be detected from a network. Upon detecting such a 
situation, a built-in disabling function would be invoked that transitions the IC into 
a non-functional state. If this state is a black hole, the Ie cannot be used. 
Generally speaking, combinations of the two employed security mechanisms, variability-
based uniqueness of each IC, and structural manipulation of FSM while preserving 
the original behavioral specification, provide powerful basis for creating many security 
and DRM protocols. A few of the many possibilities are: (i) use of a combination of 
unique functionality and RUB for remote authentication and disablement of smart 
cards; (ii) certification that a computation was executed on a specified IC in a dis-
tributed environment; and (iii) creation of techniques to produce software than can 
only run on a specific IC, thereby preventing software piracy. 
Furthermore, the introduced method has the potential for a broad impact on the 
IC industry and military use of hardware. As an example, new royalty enforcement 
systems can be enabled: design reuse has emerged as a dominant strategy, where 
different IP cores are often supplied by different vendors. The final integrator pays 
each IP supplier royalties that are proportional to the number of manufactured ICs. 
All that is needed for royalty enforcement is that each supplier uses its own active 
metering scheme inside its IP. 
3.9 Conclusion 
We propose the first active hardware metering scheme that symmetrically protects 
the IP designer and the foundry by providing a key-exchange mechanism. The active 
metering method utilizes the unclonable variability-based ID of each silicon circuit 
(RUB) to uniquely lock the IC at the fabrication house. The FSM of the design 
is enhanced to include many added states, designed such that the RUB-based state 
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is one of the random states with a very high probability. The state addition was 
done in such a way that it would not affect the functionality of the original design. 
The key to the locked IC can only be provided by the designer who knows the state 
transition graph of the design. We have illustrated the addition of black hole states 
to the BFSM which can be utilized for remote control and disabling of the ICs. 
Black hole states are also useful in making the protection scheme highly resilient 
against the brute force attacks. We presented a low overhead implementation for the 
hardware metering scheme, identified a comprehensive set of possible attacks, and 
provided mechanisms that make the scheme much more resilient against the attacks. 
Experimental evaluations of the proposed metering method on standard benchmark 
circuits illustrate the low overhead and the applicability of the approach on industrial-
size designs and its resiliency against different attacks. 
Chapter 4 
Remote Activation of ICs for Piracy Prevention 
and Digital Right Management* 
Abstract 
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We introduce a remote activation scheme that aims to protect integrated circuits 
(Ie) intellectual property (IP) against piracy. Remote activation enables designers 
to lock each working Ie and to then remotely enable it. The new method exploits 
inherent unclonable variability in modern manufacturing for unique identification (ID) 
and integrate the IDs into the circuit functionality. The objectives are realized by 
replication of a few states of the finite state machine (FSM) arid adding control to the 
state transitions. On each chip, the added control signals are a function of the unique 
IDs and are thus unclonable. On standard benchmark circuits, the experimental 
results show that the novel activation method is stable, unclonable, attack-resilient, 
while having a low overhead and a unique key for each Ie. 
4.1 Introduction 
The increasing manufacturing cost of Ies has bolstered the horizontal semiconductor 
business model, in which design and manufacturing are done by different companies. 
As a consequence, the sole asset of a design company is the hardware intellectual 
"This work is published in: Y. Alkabani, F. Koushanfar, and M. Potkonjak, Remote activation 
of ics for piracy prevention and digital right management, in IEEE/ ACM International Conference 
on Computer Aided Design (ICCAD), pp. 674-677,2007. 
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property (IP), since designers typically do not control the number of ICs manufactured 
from a design. Also, hardware piracy, the illegal manufacturing of ICs using IPs, is 
omnipresent. 
With the horizontal business model, digital rights management (DRM) is becom-
ing an increasingly challenging problem due to the following factors. (i) The designers 
have no control over manufacturing of individual ICs from a unique mask. (ii) The 
IC internals are intrinsically opaque, and hence there is limited controllability and 
observability inside manufactured ICs. (iii) Hardware piracy of state-of-the-art IPs 
may only be done at fabrication facilities (fabs), where there are large resources and 
access to the most advanced tools and techniques. (iv) Finally, there is an asymmet-
ric relationship between the designer and the fab, since the fab has full access to the 
design files, netlists and test vectors. 
To overcome the hardware IP piracy problem, various watermarking [38] and me-
tering protocols have been proposed [34, 25, 3]. IC metering involves a set of security 
protocols that enables the design house to gain post-fabrication control through pas-
sive or active counts of produced ICs, through the monitoring of IC properties and 
use, and through remote runtime disabling. Note that, IP watermarking is not the 
same as metering. A watermark uniquely identifies each IP, not each IC, and hence 
the existence of the same mask does not affect the watermarked IP. With passive 
metering, each IC is uniquely registered into a database, so a suspicious chip'S ID can 
be authenticated against the database. In active metering, the IDs lock the chip's 
functionality. Unless the corresponding key is provided, the chip will not be able to 
operate properly. We propose a new IC activation scheme that works by not just 
active metering of ICs during the chip activation, but by also remotely enabling the 
chip's regular operation. We denote the diverse ID generation circuitry by a Diverse 
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Random Unique Block (RUB). For each IC, the block generates a unique RUB output 
for each RUB input vector. 
Figure 4.1 : F8M with a lock on the replicated state (82). 
In Figure 5.1, we illustrate the new remote activation method. The F8M of a 
design with 6 states 80 to 85 is shown, where one of the states (82) is replicated three 
times: 8'2, 8" 2,8'" 2. Once the design reaches the state 811 it will transition to one of 
the four replicated states, depending on the RUB output (which is a function of its 
specific input selected by the control circuitry). Unless the correct key corresponding 
to the diverse RUB is provided, the state cannot transition to 83 (hence it will be 
locked). 
1 
1 
1 
o 
Figure 4.2 : Close-up of the locking/unlocking mechanism. 
Figure 4.2 shows a closer look into the locking/unlocking mechanism. Assume that 
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there is a two-bit input controlling the edge transitions of the F8M. Assume further 
that upon reaching the state 811 some input key with the value 1110 is selected and 
the corresponding RUB output of the 10 under test is 0011. The first two bits define 
the transition to one of the next replicated states (82 in Figure 4.2). Now, unless the 
next input is 01, the state cannot reach 83 and the circuit will be locked. To enable 
the transition, the next two RUB outputs (11) should be XOR'd with a key that 
can generate the 01 output (in this case 10 is the key). For each authorized chip, a 
specific set of RUB inputs will be provided to the fab. Upon manufacturing, the fab 
will test the output of the specific input set by scanning the FF chains and reporting 
the stored values. The corresponding output set will be sent to the designer who 
will provide the corresponding key to unlock the chip. The specific input sets and 
corresponding unique keys will be stored on the chip to ensure proper operation. In 
practice, longer inputs and more replicated states will be used to guarantee security. 
4.2 Related Work 
Manufacturing variability (MV) has been used for generation of unique on chip IDs 
[24, 26, 30]; however, the IDs were not integrated into the functionality. The first 
10 metering scheme was proposed in 2001 [34, 25], but the scheme was passive. 
Variability-induced delays were used for authentication and security [31, 32, 33, 52]. 
The underlying mechanism was Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) that map 
a set of challenges to a set of responses, based on an intractably complex physical 
system. Because MV could cause delay differences among lOs made from the same 
mask, PUFs would be unique. A database of challenge-response sets is formed for each 
10. The chip is authenticated if it can retrieve the output of one or more challenge 
inputs. Note that, PUFs were only used for authentication against a database, and 
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have not been an integral part of the control path like our scheme. 
The first active metering was recently proposed [3]. The method added exponen-
tially many states to the original FSM of the design and exploited a static ID to lock 
the initial state of each IC. The ICs are unlocked with a key that uses the structural 
knowledge of the FSM graph to guide the transition from the unique start-up state 
to the initial functional state. The difference between this work and [3] is that, here, 
we do not add exponentially many states, but instead we replicate very few number 
of states. Also, unlike [3], our IDs are not static, but instead are a set of diverse 
unique IDs extracted from each chip. Perhaps most importantly, our scheme does 
not just lock the initial reset state of a design, but it also ciphers the functional states 
and their transitions. Thus, the diverse IDs are continuously checked against the 
transitions. 
4.3 Remote Ie Activation 
Key exchange protocol. The remote activation protocol is designed to protect both 
the designer and the fab by requiring a key exchange mechanism for IC activation. 
It can be summarized using the following pseudocode. 
1. The designer sends the design files to the fab, test vectors, and the number of 
required copies to the fab. 
2. The fab manufactures the required number of ICs, applies the test vectors and 
sends the IC outputs to the designer. 
3. The designer uses the values sent by the fab and computes a key to operate the 
chip properly. 
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4. The fab stores the key on the chip and tests the chip in the operational mode. 
The remote activation scheme works in the following way. 
A. Modification of the FSM. To modify the FSM we replicate a few states a number 
of times. For instance, if we have states So to Sn, we can pick state Si and replicate 
it 4 times to get SL Sr, st, and st'. Note that adding one bit to the state will 
exponentially increase the number of states making the process of adding states have 
a low overhead. For each added state all the transitions to and from the replicated 
state are connected and are a function of a subset of the bits coming from the RUB. 
The transitions from the replicated states converge to the same state if they have 
the correct inputs from the RUB. Half the bits responsible for the transitions to and 
from the replicated states come directly from the RUB. The rest of the bits have to 
be keyed to be set to the correct value as shown in Figure 4.2. To maintain proper 
functionality when the circuit operates, the correct key value is used to cause the 
transition from one of the copies of Si to the correct state. 
B. The unclonable random unique blocks (RUBs). Lee et al.[32] designed a circuit that 
generates many unique outputs using selector bits that select various path segments 
and creates racing paths. We build upon this architecture by adding nonlinearity 
to make the structure more secure and reverse engineering resilient compared to the 
original circuit in [32]. The added nonlinearity is not only placed in the delayed paths 
segments but is also used by the selectors. Figure 4.3 shows the block diagram of a 
new RUB circuit. The circuit has nine inputs II to 19 and three outputs 0 1 to 0 3 , 
The main building blocks of the RUB are selector elements (Sel), delay elements (D), 
and arbiters (A). A selector element has two input lines and one selection line. Based 
on the value of the selection line the inputs either pass directly to the output or are 
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0, 
0, 
0, 
Figure 4.3 : A non-linear unclonable random unique block. 
switched. The arbiter gives an output that depends on the input that arrives first 
(with the shortest delay) at power-up. 
C. Input and key memory. The input to the RUB and the key are stored in memory to 
maintain the proper operation of the circuit. At the initial stage the input memory is 
loaded with different values to give read out data to the designer to compute the key. 
Once the designer computes the key and gives it to the fab, the key in the memory 
will be loaded to ensure that the transitions that occur as a function of the RUB occur 
correctly and the chip is functional. Figure 4.2 shows the input and key memory and 
how they are XOR'd with the output of the RUB for correct functionality. 
D. Modification of the FSM control circuitry. The control circuitry of the FSM is 
modified to ensure that the transitions to the replicated states are function of the 
output coming directly from the RUB. The transitions from these states are functions 
of the RUB and the key. For example, they can be combined using a simple XOR as 
shown in Figure 4.2. 
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4.4 Attacks 
In this section we discuss some of the potential attacks on the remote activation 
scheme and how we address them. 
(i) Brute-force attack. The application of random inputs is not a feasible attack 
because of the exponentially low probability of -correct guessing. 
(ii) Reverse engineering of FSM. This attack is infeasible because the extraction of 
the corresponding state transition graph (STG) is a computationally intractable task. 
(iii) Combinational redundancy removal. The attacker may use the combinational 
redundancy removal, a procedure that attempts to remove the combinational logic 
that is not necessary for the correct behavior of the circuit. The integration into the 
functionality of the circuit makes this attack impossible. 
(iv) RUB emulation. The goal of this attack is to create a reconfigurable imple-
mentation capable of realizing hardware that has the identical functional and timing 
characteristics of a RUB for which a legal key is already received. However, the state 
of technology prevents this type of attack. 
4.5 Experimental results 
We studied the area, delay, and power overheads and the diversity of the keys gen-
erated by the RUB. We used sequential benchmarks from the MCNC'91 set, and 
Berkeley SIS for synthesis. 
4.5.1 Area, delay, and power overheads 
To modify the original FSM, a C program linked to SIS was written to manipulate 
the FSM and replicate some states. The number of replicated states was set as a 
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Table 4.1 : Area overhead for adding six extra states for Random and Heuristic state 
selection. 
II Original II Random II Heurl8tlc I 
BM PI atateB area area % area % 
planet 7 48 888 1,373 54.62 1,191 34.12 
8510 19 47 605 1,005 66.12 987 63.14 
81494 8 48 859 2,655 209 1,276 48.54 
81488 8 48 880 2,457 179 1,248 41.82 
8298 3 135 2,951 5,924 101 3,769 27.72 
dk16 2 27 460 964 109.6 898 95.22 
8and II 32 1,092 3,851 253 1,634 49.63 
8820 18 24 430 918 ll3.5 1,040 141.9 
8832 18 24 425 927 ll8.1 1,135 167.1 
8tyr 9 30 633 1,777 180.7 1,306 106.3 
Avg " 10.3 I 46.3 I 922.3 " 2,185 I 138.4 " 1,448 I 77.54 I 
parameter. We selected the states for replication using two methods,random selection 
and by selecting the state with the least number of outgoing edges in original STG. 
Table 4.1 shows the area overhead for the original FSM, the modified FSM with 
random state selection Random, and the modified FSM with states with least edges 
selected Heuristic. The first column shows the names of ten sequential benchmarks 
from MCNC'91. The second, third, and fourth columns show the number of primary 
inputs, the number of states, and the area of the original FSM after optimization 
using SIS. The remainder of the columns shows the area and the percentage overhead 
for adding six extra states using the Random and the Heuristic methods, respectively. 
All the circuits are optimized using the same parameters. The average overhead is 
138.4% and 77.5% for the Random and the Heuristic methods, respectively. 
Table 4.2 demonstrates the delay and power overheads for the Random and Heuris-
tic methods compared to the original FSMs. It is interesting to note that in many 
cases the delay overhead is negative. The average delay overhead is 3.7% and -11.4% 
for the Random and Heuristic methods respectively, the power overhead is 148.9% and 
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Table 4.2 : Delay and power overhead for Random and Heuristic selection methods. 
I II Original II Random II Heuristic I 
BM del~ power del~ % power % del~ % power % 
planet 186.2 3,087 93.90 -49.57 4,963 60.77 67.70 -63.64 4,374 41.68 
.510 47.60 2,280 81.10 70.38 3,679 61.34 70.90 48.95 3,489 53.02 
s1494 115.60 2,958 143.60 24.22 9,435 218.98 84.60 -26.82 4,560 54.15 
sl488 134.9 3,011 91.40 -32.25 8,637 186.86 86.70 -35.73 4,450 47.81 
.298 201.50 10,798 134.3 -33.35 26,005 140.81 182.60 -9.38 13,896 28.68 
dk18 104.70 1,662 87.50 -16.43 3,595 116.32 74.70 _ -28.65 3,361 102.26 
sand 74.80 3,917 88.80 18.72 14,312 265.37 61.50 -17.78 6,084 55.31 
.820 36.30 1,430 54.70 50.69 3,054 113.49 47.30 30.30 3,729 160.71 
.832 33.60 1,441 44.20 31.55 3,320 130.37 45.40 35.12 4,014 178.50 
.tyr 128.20 2,170 93.40 -27.15 6,401 194.96 68.90 -46.26 4,718 117.40 
Ava 106.34 3,276 91.29 3.68 8,340 148.93 79.03 -11.39 5,267 83.95 
84%. The results show that the Heuristic method outperforms the Random method 
on average by cutting the overheads into half. Using the Heuristic method the aver-
age area and power consumption of the modified circuit is less than the double of the 
original circuit. Because the FSM is usually a very small part of the circuit, a larger 
area and power overhead is not expected to affect the overall system area and power 
on a chip. 
Figure 4.4 shows the area, delay, and power overhead of adding different numbers 
of extra states using the Heuristic method. It can be seen that the overheads are 
nonlinear due to the optimization of the circuits during synthesis. Also it can be seen 
that the delay overhead decreases as the number of the extra states increases. 
4.5.2 Diversity of the keys 
To study the diversity of the keys produced by the RUB, we simulate a four stages 
RUB. The RUB has 12 input bits and 4 output bits. We randomly generated 1,000 
RUBs and calculated the number of inputs generating different outputs for every 
RUB. Figure 4.5 shows a histogram of the average number of inputs that have unique 
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Figure 4.4 : Area, delay, and power overhead for different numbers of extra states for 
benchmark s298. 
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Figure 4.5 : The average number of inputs producing unique output for 1,000 different 
RUBs. 
outputs for the 1,000 simulated RUBs. The figure shows diversity in the keys gener-
ated by the different RUBs. 
4.6 Conclusion 
We have developed a new approach for remote enabling, disabling and metering of 
integrated circuits. The approach leverages inherent manufacturing variability of 
modern and pending Si technologies. The key conceptual novelty is that designers 
can control ICs remotely continuously and concurrently with execution. The approach 
is evaluated in terms of delay, power, and area overheads as well as in terms of the 
achieved security. 
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Chapter 5 
Active Control and Digital Rights Management of 
Integrated Circuit IP Cores* 
Abstract 
We introduce the first approach that can actively control multiple hardware intellec-
tual property (IP) cores used in an integrated circuit (IC). The IP rights owner(s) can 
remotely monitor, control, enable, or disable each individual IP on each chip. The 
approach introduces a paradigm shift in the microelectronic business model, nurtur-
ing smaller businesses, and supporting the design-reuse paradigm. The IPs can be 
controlled by the original designer or by the designers who reuse them. Each IP has 
a built-in functional lock that pertains to the unique unclonable ID of the chip. A 
control structure that coordinates the locking and unlocking of the IPs is embedded 
within the IC. We introduce a trusted third party approach for issuing certificates 
of authenticity, in case it is required for the applications. We present methods for 
safeguarding the approach against two attack sources: the foundry (fab) , and the 
reuser. Experimental results show that our approach can be implemented with low 
area, power, and delay overheads making it suitable for embedded systems. The 
introduced control method is also low overhead in terms of the added steps to the 
current design and manufacturing flow. 
*This work is published in:Y. Alkabani and F. Koushanfar, Active control and digital rights 
management of integrated circuit IP cores, in ACM/IEEE International Conference on Compilers, 
Architectures, and Synthesis for Embedded Systems (CASES), pp. 227-234, 2008. 
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5.1 Introduction 
The state-of-the-art digital ICs are increasingly complex. The progressive demand 
for multiple applications, performance, and functionality for integrated circuits has 
resulted in extreme CMOS miniaturization that add to the complexity. Building, 
operating, maintaining and upgrading silicon fabs for the complex designs is pnr 
hibitively expensive, e.g., upgrade to the current technology, 45nm, costs about $4bn 
[23]. The leading edge design companies are fabless. Even the large semiconductor 
companies including Texas Instruments (TI) and Freescale that had in-house manu-
facturing recently started to outsource their fabrication. 
Because of the complexity, adapting the design reuse paradigm is the key to ad-
dress constraints such as low-power, real-time budgets, silicon efficiency, time-to-
market, and low cost [53]. A consequence of the current shift towards the fabless 
business model and design reuse is increased horizontalization of the microelectronic 
industry. Integration of multiple functionalities, applications, and design techniques 
has lead to modularity and specialization of design houses. 
Many fabless design companies, particularly the specialized IP core designers are 
small. Their major investment is the technical and engineering staff and human 
resources who work together to produce the IP product. If the IP is ever exploited 
the company loses its capital investment. It is also likely that the IPs accidentally 
or through negligence are misused. For example, a design engineer (who we call a 
"reuser") may not take the time to check each core's license agreement. The IP-core 
design companies only receive revenue when their core is licensed to reusers, regardless 
of the volume and profit of the end product(s) that typically include multiple IPs. 
The presence of smaller companies is essential for a competitive market, but those 
companies endanger consolidation in the current business model. 
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We propose a novel approach that allows the IP core providers to gain post-
fabrication control over their IPs on each chip. The approach introduces a paradigm 
shift in the digital rights management (DRM) of integrated circuits IP cores for 
vendors, designers and foundries. Depending on the application, the method may be 
used to control the number of chips that implement the IP, to remotely and actively 
enable or disable the usage. The misuse of the IP products is not only detected, 
but also prevented. The method works by uniquely locking the functionality of the 
IP core embedded in the manufactured chips, such that the rights owner is the only 
entity who can provide the key to unlock it. Our contributions include: 
• Introduction of the first architecture and implementation for individual control of 
each IP core, in a multi-IP design. 
• Integration of locking into each IP's functionality and coordinating the IPs by the 
reuser's control core. 
• Control of the IP cores that may be done by the original core provider, the IP 
reuser, or both. 
• Successful integration of the method within the standard synthesis flow, with a 
minimal addition of steps. 
• Low-overhead and efficient implementation of the approach on chips containing 
multiple industrial benchmark IP cores. 
• Ensuring trustworthiness of the key-exchange protocol by introducing a trusted 
third party providing certificate of authenticity. 
• Discussion of attacks and providing safeguards. 
• Introduction of a number of possible applications that are enabled by the new 
multi-IP protection method. 
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Motivational Example: Figure 5.1 presents a reuser's design which contains multi-
ple IP cores. The cores denoted by IP1 , IP2 , ... , to IPK are the protected ones. The 
functional control unit of each IP is represented by a finite state machine (FSM). The 
circuit designer (reuser) includes two new modules in her design. One added part is 
an identification (ID) circuitry that extracts the unique identification bits for the chip 
using the silicon variability [54, 55, 56]. The other addition is a control module that 
is embedded within the central controller of the chip. Each protected IP is directly 
connected to the the ID circuitry. Each of the protected IPs contains a lock within 
their functional states. 
- ID: Unique Idenfier 
for the circuit 
- Cont: Reusers 
ltrol module 
- liP designers' 
lock and key 
A: IC designer's 
lock and k~ 
Figure 5.1 : A reuser's design including multiple IP cores. Each IP may be 
locked/unlocked by the IP designer or the reuser, depending on the application. 
The remote enabling/disabling provides two sets of locks and keys, one for the 
designer and one for the reuser. The locks are embedded within the control structure 
of each IP that can be represented by a finite state machine (FSM) [4]. There are two 
major advantages for the selected locking/unlocking mechanism: (i) the IDs come 
from the variations of the physical structure of silicon and are therefore random and 
unclonable, and (ii) the locks are integrated within the functional control structure, 
so removing or tampering the lock would tamper the functionality, rendering the IP 
unusable. Furthermore, as we will show, modifying the FSM does not result in a 
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significant overhead. 
Many protection, security, and DRM protocols can be enabled by the new IP lock-
ing/unlocking method. For example, the core providers can protect their IPs against 
overbuilding a licensed product, since each IP would be locked upon manufacturing. 
As another example, the reuser who has another set of locks/keys on the IP can select 
which IPs (or even features) are activated on the chip, e.g., for charging the customers 
who are willing to pay for added features. In the remainder of the paper we show the 
details of the new approach, implementation, experiments, and applications. 
5.2 Related Work 
Methods for digital design reuse and intellectual property trading are emerging [57, 
58, 53, 3, 4, 2]. Protection of IPs in the reuse-based design flow is of paramount 
importance, but the prior work on individual IP protection has been limited. Most 
of the effort has been focused on FPGA soft IP core protection [59, 60]. A number 
of watermarking methods for IP identification have been proposed, but unlike our 
method that is active and uniquely locks each chip, a watermark is passive and is the 
same on all the chips implementing the same design [8, 38, 9]. A watermark can only 
be used to solve disputes about illegal usage of a design. It cannot identify, activate 
or disable individual ICs or IPs. 
The inherent and unclonable silicon manufacturing variability has been used to 
uniquely identify each chip [24, 2]. Delay-based physically unclonable functions 
(PUFs) were constructed to extract the variability in circuit timing as a function 
of input (challenge) bits, generating a unique output (response) that can be used 
for identification and security [61, 55, 56]. PUFs were implemented in both ASICs 
and FPGAs [32, 62]. Several applications of PUFs are emerging, including RFID, 
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proof of execution on a specific processor, securing processors, and active metering 
[54, 61, 62, 4, 63]. 
Recently, securing IPs in an ASIC design by individually tagging each core was 
proposed [64]. Since the tags are separated from the functionality, they are subject to 
removal attacks by both the reusers and the foundry. Note that approaches that use 
traditional implementations of cryptography protocols for securing at the low level 
are both high overhead and non-secure [65, 66], since the digitally stored keys are 
subject to physical and side-channel attacks [44]. 
Our new approach adapts the mechanism in [4], who integrated the unique iden-
tifiers of the chip into its control structure. The approach presented here includes 
several new aspects: First, multiple IP cores are controlled, not just one. Second, we 
consider interactions among the IP core designers, reusers, and the foundry, whereas 
the previous work only considered the designer-foundry relation. Third, unlike the 
previous work that only developed a control mechanism, we create a system-level 
secure IP integration solution and discuss the supply chain interactions. Fourth, we 
introduce the role of trusted integrator who will be useful for a secure design flow. 
Fifth, the reuser's role and possibilities of attacks are discussed for the first time. 
Lastly, the new approach directly applies to a number of novel system-level security, 
protection, and DRM methods that can be very useful for embedded systems (Section 
5.8). 
5.3 Flow of the Active Control for IP Cores 
Figure 5.2 shows the overall flow of the new IP protection approach. There are four 
main entities involved: (i) IP rights owners (IP designers) who design, format and sell 
the individual IPs, (ii) IC rights owner (reuser) who integrates multiple IPs, including 
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the open IPs and I/O interfaces, into one IC, (iii) The fabrication plant (fab), and (iv) 
an authorized system verifier; who we call a certificate authority (CA). This entity 
ensures the trust between hardware IP providers, reusers, and the fab. 
Figure 5.2 : The flow of the active control for integrated circuits' IP cores. 
While the first three components are commonly present in the IC design cycle, the 
last component is new. CA is the trusted third party component for many asymmetric 
cryptography protocols, including several public key infrastructure (PKI) schemes. 
The new model is an asymmetric security scheme based on the keys provided by the 
IP designers and system designer. The CA provides trust by authorizing the parties; 
preventing possible breaches. 
The flow can be described as follows. The IP designer forms the FSM of the 
design by using the high level design description. Then, the lock(s) are strategically 
embedded in the FSM. The modified finite state machine is called the boosted finite 
state machine (BFSM). The reuser may integrate multiple locked IPs, in addition to 
other components, including her own designs, unlocked IPs, I/O peripherals, memory, 
and the master identification/control parts. The master identification/control consists 
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of a controlling finite state machine (CFSM) and a PUF. The CFSM interacts and 
controls the various IPs; it can enable/disable the other components. The PUF 
provides a mean for identifying each IC implementing the design in a unique and 
unclonable way. The ready-to-fab designs are shipped to the CA who certifies the 
IP cores and the reuser. The material is then sent to the fab who makes the masks 
and produces a number of ICs as specified by the contract. The operations described 
so far are shown by solid arrows on the figure. The dashed arrows present the steps 
required for key exchange transactions. 
The fabricated ICs are nonfunctional and have locks on the CFSM and on the 
protected IPs from the providers. For each IC, the fab tests the PUF input and 
runs it through the flip flops (FFs) scan chain. The state of the IC will be read out 
from the FFs and sent to the CA who will in turn supply the state of each chip to 
the authorized reusers and IP providers. Each of the contacted parties will produce 
the specific keys to unlock the component. Also, the IP provider computes the error 
correcting code (ECC) for the lock, to mask the possible few changes caused by the 
fluctuations in the PUF identifiers. The keys are then sent back to the CA, who 
certifies the consent of the rights owners before sending them to the fab. 
5.4 IP Control Method 
In this section, we present the main modifications made to a multi-IP design to apply 
the method. 
5.4.1 BFSMs 
Each of the IP designers need to modify the FSM of their designed IP such that 
they embed a lock in it. The modified control structure is the BFSM. The BFSM is 
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designed such that both its states and transitions are a function of the unique chip 
identifiers. The BFSM attempts to form a unique control path on each of the chips, 
while all the chips are from the same mask [4]. 
The BFSM of an IP core should satisfy the following properties. 
• It must have incorrect functionality (locked) as long as the key is not provided. 
• The key can be easily computed by the party who knows the BFSM structure 
and difficult to find otherwise. 
• Knowing the key for one Ie must not help in finding the key for another Ie of 
the same design. 
• Once the key is provided, the IP would function correctly. 
Note that unlike symmetric cryptography where the keys are used to reverse a 
trap-door function and revealing the keys tampers the security, the keys here do not 
convey significant information about the lock. This is because the lock is in the 
structure of the state transition graph that is only known to the designer. 
The same BFSM structure can be exploited to disable the chip during its oper-
ation. All what is needed is to modify the locks. For example, changing the PUF 
challenges will ensure that the functionality is trapped in a locked state. 
5.4.2 CFSM 
The overall FSM of the design that is devised by the reuse designer is also manipulated 
such that it embeds locks that allow the chip designer to lock/unlock her designed 
parts. Next, some states for controlling the other IPs are also included by the Ie 
designer. We refer to these added IP control signals as CFSM. The CFSM gives the 
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chip designer a level of control over the several IPs that are included in the design. 
For example, the CFSM receives signals from the IP cores about their locked/unlock 
status. The CFSM can also generate control signals that can enable or disable various 
IPs on the chip. There are many applications that can benefit from the CFSM (see 
Section 5.8). 
5.4.3 PDF 
Figure 5.3 : PUF challenge/response pairs. 
PUF is the circuitry which generates random unique values per chip. Figure 5.3 
demonstrates the high level block diagram of a PUF [54]. The PUF circuit generates 
a unique response (output) for each input vector (challenge) that is applied to it. 
Even though the response varies from one chip to the next, the response to the same 
challenge remains the same over time. 
PUF has a much larger overhead compared with BFSM and CFSM. Thus, we 
share it among the IPs to reduce the overhead. There is a need to ensure that the 
PUF is properly connected to the IPs so that the IP rights owner receives her proper 
royalties. The trusted third party (authorized system verifier) ensures the proper 
interface of PUF to the BFSMs before sending the design files to the fab. 
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Figure 5.4 : System block diagram. 
5.5 Implementation 
Figure 5.4 shows the block diagram of the system components described earlier. Let 
us assume that we have three IPs denoted by IP1 , IP2 , and IP3 . The response of the 
PDF is connected to the IPs' BFSM, and the CFSM communicates with the BFSMs 
to control (lock/unlock) them. We outline the implementation of the BFSM, PDF, 
and CFSM. 
5.5.1 BFSM Implementation 
PI 
... PO 
key 
Figure 5.5 : Implementation of the BFSM. 
The implementation of BFSM is inspired by [4] but the BFSM was further adapted 
and modified to include more states and communications with the CFSM. Figure 5.5 
shows a part of a BFSM on a sample IP core where a state Si is replicated twice 
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as S'i and S" i. The transitions to Si from Si-l are copied to its replicated states 
such that based on the PDF response, either Si or one of its replica is reached. The 
reached state is only a function of the PDF response. However, the transitions from 
the replicated states to Si+l are a function of both the PDF response and the key. 
The key and the response are XOR'd; if the output is correct, the valid state Si+l 
will be reached. Otherwise, a wrong transition (not shown on the figure) will be 
taken. PI/PO represent the set of primary inputs/outputs to the BFSM. Whenever 
a wrong transition is taken, the flag signal from the IP's BFSM is set to 1 to inform 
the CFSM that the BFSM is still unlocked. The flag value is 0 otherwise. The BFSM 
implementation steps can be summarized as follows: 
1. The n states with the least number of outgoing edges are selected for replication. 
2. Each selected state is replicated m times. 
3. Transitions to the replicated states are a function of the PDF response and are 
thus unique to each chip. 
4. Transitions from the replicated states are a function of the PDF response and 
the key. Correct transitions are only taken if the key is properly set. Incorrect 
random added transitions are taken when the key is wrong. 
5.5.2 PUF Implementations 
We implement the delay-based PDF introduced in [61]. The response is found by 
comparing the delay of two parallel paths that must be the same, but vary because of 
manufacturing fluctuations. The signal starts at the common starting point of the two 
paths on the left and ends at an arbiter which is inserted at the right end of the two 
parallel lines. If the signal on the top path arrived earlier, the arbiter output will be 
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Figure 5.6 : Implementation of the PUF. 
zero; otherwise, its output would be one. The parallel paths are divided into multiple 
segments, such that each segment is controlled by a switch. Different combinations 
of the path segments are selected by the switches, causing the racing path pair and 
also the arbiter output (response bit) to change. 
The above PUF is vulnerable to modeling attacks because of its linear structure. 
Feedforward arbiters are used to alleviate this problem [32]. The added arbiters 
compare the delays of two partial path pairs and use the arbiter output as the selector 
line for a forward switch in the circuit. Figure 5.6 shows an example of a two bit 
output delay-based PUF with random feedforward arbiters which may also connect 
different path pairs. Switches s[l] to s[n] represent the cascade of switches for the first 
output, and s'[l] to s'[n] are the switches for the second output. From each path pair, 
we randomly select the output of a few switches and connect them to arbiters, then 
connect the output of these arbiters to selection lines of other switches constructing 
a feedforward connection. The selection lines of switches that are not connected in a 
feedforward (not shown in the figure) represent the challenge to the PUF, while r[l] 
and r[2] represent the response of the PUF. 
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Figure 5.7 : Implementation of the CFSM. 
5.5.3 CFSM Implementation 
The CFSM is implemented as a finite state machine that is embedded and hidden 
inside the main FSM (BFSM) of the IC. A block diagram of the CFSM control signals 
is shown in Figure 5.7. The CFSM inputs can be divided into two groups: (1) inputs 
coming from the IP cores' BFSMs (ll:n), and (2) external inputs (CS) that can be 
used to control the IC and enable/disable the IPs remotely. h:n signals from BFSMs 
inform the CFSM if an IP is locked. The CS signals are used to upload the main 
key that determines which features (IPs) can be activated on a particular IC. Note 
that setting this key will not unlock the IPs, however, it will only help preventing the 
CFSM from disabling the whole chip when the IPs are locked. The output signals 
from the CFSM are d1:n that represent the disabling signals for the BFSMs in the 
IC. The CFSM continuously monitors all the BFSMs and if a BFSM that is supposed 
to be enabled is locked, the CFSM disables all the enabled IPs to detect and fix the 
control FSM. 
5.6 Attacks and Safeguards 
We envision two categories of attacks on the proposed method: foundry level attacks 
and IC designer level attacks. The IC designer (reuser) and the foundry do not 
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have the same knowledge about the design and do not share the same objectives. For 
example, the reuser may tamper with the communicated signals to the IPs to overrule 
the owners' rights. The foundry may also overlook the rights of the IC designer. 
Foundry level attacks and countermeasures are: 
• Brute-force attack. This attack can be performed by continuously applying 
random inputs to each IP until the correct value of the key is found. This attack 
is not feasible for one IP because the probability of guessing the correct key is 
extremely low [3]. Having more than one IP locked in addition to the main 
design renders the attack even more infeasible. 
• Reverse engineering of the BFSMs and the CFSM. One might try to 
reverse engineer the BFSM and the CFSM by STG extration. However, the 
computation of the STG is a computationally intractable task especially that 
the BFSMs are enlarged versions of the FSMs of the IPs in the system, and the 
CFSM is obfuscated by hiding its states within the large state-space of the IC's 
main FSM [8]. 
• PUF emulation. This attack attempts to emulate- the behavior of the PUF of 
one unlocked IC and replicate it on the others. However, this attack is infeasible 
in the state-of-the-art manufacturing and software emulation is much slower and 
can be detected [55, 56]. 
• Combinational redundancy removal. Using a combinational redundancy 
removal software, one can try to remove all the extra states added to the different 
parts of the design. However, since all the modifications are integrated within 
the functionality of the different IPs, they are not redundant and this attack 
will not be successful. 
IC designer level attacks and countermeasures are: 
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• Bypassing the PUF. The adversarial reuser may try to bypass the PDF 
interface to the other IPs so that only one key is needed to unlock different IPs, 
maintaining only the connections of the PDF to the main BFSM to keep the 
reuser rights. However, it is the responsibility of the CA to check the interfaces 
and ensure that the PDF is properly connected to the IPs. 
• Tampering with the PUF. The designer can tamper with the PDF such 
that one of the racing paths is much longer than the other. This can cancel out 
the effect of MV and produce deterministic output for all the ICs. However, 
the trusted system verifier should also test and certify the PDF's randomness 
[55, 56]. 
5.7 Experimental Results 
The proposed method is implemented and evaluated using the Berkeley SIS synthesis 
tool. All the programs are written in C. MCNC'91 sequential benchmarks are used 
to represent FSMs of different IPs. It should be noted that the FSM that contains 
the control part of any IP represents a very small fraction of the overall size of the 
design [1]. Thus, even tripling the overall area or power of these FSMs will not 
significantly affect the overall area and power of the IP. However, the delay of the 
FSM can affect the speed of the IP and thus, delay is the most important design 
metric in our implementation. 
We show the overhead for using one and five IPs. Table 5.1 demonstrates the over-
head when applying the metering method on one IP. The overhead number includes 
the overhead due to both the BFSM and the CFSM. The first column represents the 
benchmark number (C#) which will be used to refer to the benchmark in this section. 
The second column represents the name of the benchmark circuit. The third column 
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c# circuit PI states area delay power area % delay % power % 
1 planet 7 48 888 186.2 3,087 1752 97 70.2 -62.3 6428 108.2 
2 s510 19 47 605 47.6 2,280 1426 136 49.9 4.8 4555.8 99.8 
3 s1494 8 48 859 115.6 2,958 1746 103 65.8 -43.1 5178.8 75.1 
4 81488 8 48 880 134.9 3,011 2045 132 68.1 -49.5 6008.8 99.6 
5 s298 3 135 2,951 201.5 10,798 5960 102 136.8 -32.1 22358.8 107.1 
6 dk16 2 27 460 104.7 1,662 1970 328 49.3 -52.9 5886.8 254.2 
7 sand 11 32 1,092 74.8 3,917 1092 0 59.6 -20.3 8584.8 119.2 
8 styr 9 30 633 128.2 2,170 2180 244 52.7 -58.9 6218.8 186.6 
Mean 2271 143 69 -39 8,153 131 
Table 5.1 : The overhead of BFSM modifications for one IP. 
shows the number of primary inputs (PIs) of the benchmark before modification. 
The fourth, fifth, and sixth column show the area, delay, and power overheads of the 
original benchmark. The rest of the columns show the area, delay and power of the 
modified IP and the percentage overhead of each parameter. It can be seen that the 
area and power overheads are on the average 143% and 131% respectively. Also, the 
delay overhead is low and is not affected by the number of IPs on the ICs. Thus, we 
do not report the delay overheads in our subsequent evaluations. 
Next, we add a 16 stage random feedforward PUF with 64 cascaded switches per 
stage. The PUF has a total of 64 challenge bits and 16 response bits since we share 
the selector inputs that are below each other to keep the number of circuit inputs low. 
If we include the PUF in the overhead calculation, the overhead would be large. Note 
that the MCNC benchmarks are only control circuits and they do not include memory 
and I/O periphery/interfaces that are the area/power consuming components. Thus, 
the percentage of the added circuitry's overhead is much smaller than demonstrated. 
Table 5.2 shows the overhead for integrating five benchmark circuits randomly 
selected from Table 5.1. It can be seen that the overheads without adding the PUF 
are almost constant. However, since the PUF's overhead is much larger than the 
FSM's overhead, adding the value of the overhead of the PUF to the system causes 
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c# area % power % 
7,4,1,5,8 13,281 106 50,702 121 
2,2,4,2,7 7,611 101 29,129 112 
3,7,8,1,8 9,161 123 33,545 135 
3,5,8,6,1 13,858 139 47,135 128 
2,5,6,6,5 17,573 137 62,276 129 
6,7,1,2,3 8,187 110 31,528 127 
7,2,5,3,8 12,650 106 47,970 117 
8,5,1,3,2 13,309 124 45,789 115 
mean 11,954 118 43,509 123 
Table 5.2 : CFSM overhead for integration of five IPs. 
the overhead to decrease as we increase the number of the IPs sharing the PUF. 
Figure 5.8 shows the decrease of the overhead as we increase the number of IPs 
sharing the PUF. 
5.8 Applications 
The ability to uniquely identify each copy of an IP in a design-reuse paradigm enables 
a range of new applications, inluding: 
Protection against foundry overbuilding. The IP control and CFSM control 
methods eliminate the possibility of overbuilding and hence prevent piracy by requir-
ing the consent of the original designer and IP providers for enabling/disabling of 
their cores. 
Protection against licensed designers' overuse. A reuser may utilize a singly 
licensed core in multiple designs. Detection of misused IP cores in a large design is 
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Figure 5.8 : The change of the overhead with increasing the number of IPs sharing 
the PUF. 
a very hard problem. With the new method, no IP will be activated without the 
consent of its original designer. 
Interval licensing by remote enabling/disabling of IPs. Runtime disabling/enabling 
of IPs can be done since the chips that contain the IPs are identified and can be de-
tected online. A possible application is interval licensing, where the product royalty 
must be frequently paid for continuous usage of the IP; otherwise, the IP is disabled. 
Software/content metering. The unique IP identifiers can be further exploited 
for controlling the software and content running on the hardware. 
Ownership proof. The original key for operating an IP core is given only for one 
set of PUF responses. A way to prove the ownership of the Ie is to change the 
challenge inputs and then ask the designer to provide a new key which renders this 
device operational. The designer who has the full information of the STG can easily 
provide the new key, but other entities cannot. Thus, the IP rights owners can assert 
their ownership by online checking and authentication. 
Multiple levels of protection. The approach introduces symmetry to the current 
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asymmetric business model. Not only the reuser, but also the IP designer and the fab 
are protected by the symmetry. In addition to preventing piracy, the false accusations 
of overbuilding or overuse are prevented. 
Enabling pay-as-you-configure method for the reuser. The chip designer em-
beds its locks in the functionality of the IP cores. The reuser can design its chips such 
that the IPs that provide additional functionality are disabled. Only the customers 
who pay the proper fees may enable those IPs. 
Support for the design reuse paradigm. One of the greatest challenges in reuse-
based design is protection of the rights of the IP owners. Since the proposed method 
targets digital rights management of IPs, it supports the design reuse paradigm that is 
essential to the development and evolvement of the modern designs and semiconductor 
industry [67]. 
5.9 Conclusion 
We introduced the first approach, architecture and implementation for actively and 
uniquely controlling the functionality of each IP, in a multi IP core design and reuse 
paradigm. The approach protects the rights of the IP core owners, reusers, and the 
foundry by introducing a key exchange mechanism. The Ie and each of its embedded 
IP cores are uniquely locked upon manufacturing. The method enables the design-
ers and reusers to actively and remotely lock/unlock their IPs on each of the ICs 
post-manufacturing. We discussed a number of possible attacks, and provided coun-
termeasures against them. Experimental evaluations on standard benchmark circuits 
demonstrate the low overhead and the applicability of the approach on industrial-
strength designs. We introduced a number of newly enabled applications in protec-
tion, DRM, and security of the IP cores. 
Chapter 6 
N-Version Temperature-Aware Scheduling and 
Bindtng* 
Abstract 
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Technology scaling to nanometer nodes causes growing increase in power density and 
especially leakage that in turn result in locally hot regions on the chip. In this paper, 
we introduce a novel methodology for temperature-aware design. The methodol-
ogy embeds N-versions of the scheduler and binder such that the thermal profiles 
of the versions are distant from each other. Next, instead of using only one version 
of the scheduler and binder, a rotation of N-versions of the scheduler and binder is 
constructed for balancing the thermal profile of the chip. We propose a linear pro-
gramming framework that takes the multiple versions as the input, and constructs 
the thermal-aware rotational scheduling and binding by selecting the N most efficient 
versions and by determining the duration of each version. Our experimental evalua-
tion shows a very low overhead and an average 5% decrease in the steady-state peak 
temperature produced on the benchmark designs compared to using a schedule that 
balances the amount of usage of different modules. 
"This work is published in: Y. Alkabani, F. Koushanfar, and M. Potkonjak, N-version 
temperature-aware scheduling and binding, in International Symposium on Low Power Electron-
ics and Designs (ISLPED), pp. 331-334,2009. 
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6.1 Introduction 
The intense feature scaling of CMOS has been driven by the growing application 
demands and pursuit of improved performance, as envisioned by Moore's law. Ag-
gressive scaling lowers the cost-per-function, but it simultaneously escalates the device 
density and computational speed. The power density (i.e., power consumption per 
unit area) is also growing. The increased power generates heat on the chip. Since 
the heat propagation is slow compared with the switching activity of the IC, the 
heat would be concentrated at local regions, or so called hotspots [68, 69, 70]. The 
heat gradient increase would result in thermal stress that can speed up chip aging 
due to negative bias temperature instability, electromigration, or gradual dielectric 
breakdown. Therefore, circuit reliability would degrade. 
The excessive increase in design complexity, power density, heat gradient, and 
unreliability of the scaled CMOS devices, has made thermal-aware design and op-
timization a strong research focus. In the ASICs domain, several solutions at dif-
ferent levels of design abstraction including scheduling, resource allocation, binding, 
floorplanning, and placement were developed [71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76]. The common 
denominator for the existing work is that by assuming a certain model, they perform 
optimization (often iterative ones) that finds one optimized solution at the target 
level of the design abstraction. 
In this paper, we introduce a paradigm shift by devising a flexible synthesis 
methodology that forms N-versions of the scheduling and binding solution each with 
unique thermal characteristics. The N-versions are simultaneously embedded into one 
design. During the operation, the versions would rotate such that each version would 
be used for a predefined time duration. 
Our contributions are (1) Introduction of the concept of using rotational N-version 
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scheduler and binder. (2) Designing an algorithm for finding the N-versions. (3) 
Methodology for construction and low-overhead implementation of the N-versions. 
( 4) Development of a linear program that uses the thermal properties of each version 
to find the length and duration of N-versions. (5) Evaluation of the new method by 
comparison of the most balanced scheduler and binder. 
6.2 Related work 
In the past few years, a number of new approaches for thermal effect modeling and 
thermal-aware design has emerged. Banerjee et al. introduced a method for designing 
temperature and reliability aware cost trade-off with respect to power, performance 
and cooling [70]. Efficient modeling of the chip level and architecture level thermal 
characteristics have been proposed [68, 69]. The impact of thermal energy on power 
consumption was also studied [77]. Energy minimization has been addressed for 
a variety of systems including real-time [78], and under impact of manufacturing 
variability [63]. 
Chu and Wong proposed thermal-aware placement using a matrix synthesis method 
[71]. Tsai and Kang devised a standard cell placement tool for balancing the chip 
thermal distribution [72]. HotFloorplan is a floorplanning tool that manages the chip 
lateral heat propagation [73]. 
Mukherjee and Memik proposed a multistage integrated temperature optimiza-
tion at the architectural synthesis levels [74]. They develop an iterative optimization 
method for scheduling and binding that gets feedback the post-floorplan thermal sim-
ulations. Ni and Memik studied thermal-induced leakage power optimization by re-
dundant resource allocation [75]. Lim and Kim formulated the thermal-aware binding 
problem into a problem of repeated utilization of network flow method [76]. Shang et 
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al. explain the challenges the power and temperature optimization pose for high-level 
synthesis researchers and summarizes the research progress in the field [79]. Zhang 
and Chatha present approximation algorithms for temperature-aware scheduling; for 
a set of periodic tasks executing on a processor the latency is minimized subject to 
thermal constraints [80]. Note that there is also a vast body of literature for thermal-
aware design for MPSoC and programmable devices that are outside the scope of this 
paper. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that considers combining 
multiple schedules and allocation for efficient thermal management at the high level 
synthesis. 
6.3 Flow 
Linear Program 
The final rotating 
N-version schedule 
Figure 6.1 : Flow of the rotational N-version thermal-aware scheduling and binding. 
Figure 6.1 presents the rotational N-version thermal-aware scheduling and binding 
flow. The initial scheduling and binding is performed by list scheduling with a fixed 
timing constraint that minimizes the number of resources. A force-directed floor-
planner is used after resource selection such that the similar resources are placed far 
from each other. This is to maximize the number of alternatives for a resource such 
that the temperature increase is independent among the alternatives. Finally, the 
maximally constrained minimally constraining rule is adopted for creation of many 
105 
versions of the scheduler and binder. Next, the linear programming method finds N 
out of the several available scheduling and resource binding versions and their run-
ning durations, such that the selected versions have the smallest peak thermal energy 
dissipation. 
6.4 N-version scheduling / binding 
In this section, we describe how we generate the Multi-version schedules. Algorithm 1 
shows the main steps for generating the N'-versions (N' ~ N). The inputs to the 
Algorithm are G the CDFG of the circuit, and N' the number of generated versions. 
The output is the N' versions of the scheduling and binding method. 
The first few steps generate a layout for different resources on a grid. In Step 2, 
we find the lower bound on each resource type denoted by R4b using list scheduling. 
We do not change the critical path timing because in many of the DSP applications 
that we target, the throughput must remain constant. Next we choose the number 
of resources to be used for each module type (denoted by Rt in Step 3). Rt must 
be greater than or equal R4b to guarantee that we do not alter the timing. In Step 
4, we generate a force directed layout that ensures that resources of the same type 
are placed furthest away from each other. Finally, in Step 5, for each resource we 
determine its coordinates on the grid. 
The remainder of the steps of the Algorithm 1 form N' versions of the scheduler 
and binder. For each version, we do both scheduling and binding using a maximally 
constrained minimally constraining heuristic described as follows. In Step 8, we select 
a center resource for each module type that is the most frequently used resource in 
the pertinent version. In line 10, we compute a priority pair (Pr, nr) for each module. 
Pr is proportional to the distance from the center resource and nr is the number of 
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neighbors on the grid. The center resource of each type gets the highest priority 
(Pr = 1) to be used in a control step (maximally constrained). Further resources with 
larger number of neighbors have lower priority. We bind the operations to resources 
in order of priority. To break the ties among the resources with the same pr value, we 
use the number of neighbors of the resource nr, where the resource with the smaller 
value of nr has a higher priority (minimally constraining). 
6.5 Rotational N-version method 
Thermal model. The compact thermal model that we use to predict the temper-
ature rise due to using a certain version. The thermal energy of each module can 
be estimated by considering three different parameters: the power consumed at that 
module, the activity of the module in the schedule, and the exchange of energy with 
each of its neighboring modules. 
We model the stationary state of the IC, where its produced thermal energy is 
equal to the energy that it transfers to the environment. The two key assumptions 
are: (i) the chip is small relative to the environment and therefore, the environment 
does not change its temperature due to the heat conducted by the IC; and (ii) the 
rate of thermal change is much slower than the chip'S clock frequency Ie and thus, 
one can consider the usage rate of one module in a certain scheduling round to be a 
good approximation of the cumulative impact of that module on the temperature. 
The compact model is based on the Fourier conduction equations with constant 
thermal properties that is known to be a linear elliptic boundary value problem. 
Elliptic boundary value problems are a class of problems which do not involve the 
time variable, and instead only depend on space variables [81]. The thermal energy 
of the module at coordinate (i,j) is denoted by Qi,j respectively. Based on the Fourier 
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conduction equations, the Thermal energy (Qi,;) of the module (i,j) can be written 
as: 
Qi,; - kSi/env * ASi/env * (Ti,; - Tenv) (6.1) 
+ k Si/ Si * A Si/ Si * (Ti,; - Ti,;-l) 
+ k Si/ Si * A Si/ Si * (Ti,; -Ti,;+!) 
+ k Si/ Si * A Si/ Si * (Ti,; -Ti-l,;) 
+ k Si/ Si * A Si/ Si * (Ti,; -Ti+!,;). 
Linear program for selection of the N-versions and their durations. We 
describe how we generate the rotational schedule using a linear program. The linear 
program takes as input the N'-versions that are constructed in the previous section. 
Next it selects the N-versions out of N' for embedding in the chip. The linear program 
also assigns a duration to each of the N selected final schedules. 
The linear program is shown in Algorithm 2. The objective function (shown 
in Step 1) is to minimize the maximum temperature on the chip. This is followed 
by four types of constraints. Step 2 shows the first constraint type that represents 
local Newton heat laws. Qi,; and Ti,; are variables representing the thermal energy 
generated by and the temperature of the resource at the coordinate (i,j) respectively. 
The second type of constraints are shown in Step 3. This constraint represents 
the local thermal energy generation which is a function of the schedules. Pk,i,; is a 
constant representing the average power generated by the resource at (i,j) in version k. 
Pk is a variable denoting the fraction of time this schedule is to be used. Step 4 shows 
the global constraints for the maximum temperature on the grid, where each resource 
temperature must not exceed the maximum temperature. Finally step 5, shows the 
total activity constraint that sets the sum of all the fractions Pk to 1. To have a 
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low-overhead implementation for the rotational N-version method, we construct the 
FSM (Fr) of the rotational schedule from the FSM (FI ) of one of the versions. Fr 
has logN extra inputs added to FI that are used as the key to select a version (Ikey ). 
The number of outputs of Fr are the same as the number of outputs of Fl. The 
construction is done similar to the method described in [S2]. 
6.6 Experimental evaluations 
We evaluate the rotational N-version method on different benchmarks from HYPER 
extracted from [S3]. The benchmark names are shown in the second column of Ta-
ble 6.1. The benchmarks lee, arai, and dir are S point fast discrete cosine algorithms 
with sharply different structures. Specifically, lee is Lee's recursive sparse matrix 
factorization algorithm, arai is Arai-Agui-Nakajima algorithm, and dir is the direct 
generic definition of DCT-I algorithm. feig is Feig's fast 2D SxS DCT with prov-
ably minimal number of multiplications. The benchmarks aircraft and honda are two 
industrial strength mechanical controllers. 
The CDFG of the benchmarks are extracted in graphviz format. Matlab is used 
to read the CDFG, implement the multiple-version scheduling and binding and for 
the LP problem formulation and solving. We also generate HotSpot floorplan and 
power trace files of the schedules to evaluate the temperatures. We use the default 
values in HotSpot. 
Table 6.1 shows the improvement in the maximum temperature when we use the 
minimum resources computed by the list scheduler. The comparison is made to the 
scheduling and binding method that most balances the usage of the modules. This 
balanced version is found by giving equal priorities to all the modules in Algorithm 
1. The first column in the table represent the benchmark name. The second and 
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third columns show the number of ALU operations (aop) Multiplication operations 
(mop) in the CDFG of the benchmark. The fourth and fifth columns demonstrate 
the lower bound on the number of ALUs (A#) and Multipliers (M#). The number 
of schedules selected by the linear program (N#) is shown in the sixth column. The 
maximum temperature for the balanced scheduling and binding method (Tb) , the 
maximum temperature in the rotational N-version (Tr) method (both in °C), as well 
as percentage improvement (1) in the Temperature are presented in the last three 
columns respectively. Temperatures are computed using HotSpot. The maximum 
improvement is above 11.7% and on the average the improvement is 4.9%. 
Table 6.1 : Max temp. improvement (min resources). 
Name aop mop A# M# N# Tb(C) Tr(C) 1% 
arai 39 5 8 1 2 69.52 61.41 11.7 
lee 37 20 4 4 2 64.99 62.57 3.7 
honda 70 34 12 8 2 67.56 66.22 2.0 
dir 77 47 11 11 3 64.22 61.45 4.3 
aircraft 147 127 15 16 4 65.67 60.73 7.5 
feig_dct 505 78 48 18 8 74.75 71.67 4.1 
We next evaluate the performance of the rotational N-version method compared 
with the balanced version by adding resources. Table 6.2 shows the maximum tem-
perature improvement when we use 10% extra resources. The first column shows 
the benchmark name. The second and third columns show the number of ALUs and 
Multipliers used in each benchmark. The fourth column shows the number of sched-
ules produced by the linear program. The last three columns show the maximum 
temperatures in the balanced schedule and the rotational schedule in degree Celsius 
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and the percentage improvement. The maximum improvement is about 19%, while 
the average is 7.4%. 
Table 6.2 : Max temp. improvement (add resources). 
Name A# M# N# Tb(C) Tr(C) 1(%) 
arai 9 2 2 69.61 61.4 11.8 
lee 5 5 3 63.57 61.22 3.7 
honda 14 9 3 67.73 61.62 9.0 
dir 13 13 2 68.25 62.05 9.1 
aircraft 17 18 6 71.48 57.9 19.0 
feig_dct 53 20 3 74.32 72.27 2.8 
To study the overhead of embedding multiple schedules, we use ABC synthesis 
tool to estimate the area overhead of a single schedule and the rotational schedule. 
The area overhead for Table 6.1 is shown in Table 6.3. The first column shows the 
benchmark name. The second column shows the area in terms of the number of literals 
for the chip using a single schedule denoted by orig. The third column represents the 
area for the new schedule denoted by new. The maximum overhead is less than 5%. 
Note that benchmark 9 has zero overhead because it uses only one schedule. On the 
average the overhead is 1.3%. This shows the very low overhead of rotating among 
the versions. Note that the power overhead of the N-version method is proportional 
to its area overhead. The timing overhead is zero since all of the versions satisfy the 
timing constraint. 
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Table 6.3 : Area overhead of the N-versions in Table 6.lo 
Name Orig (lit) New (lit) % 
arai 99738 99738 0.2 
lee 83369 83519 0.2 
honda 211627 213597 0.9 
dir 229201 239662 0.6 
aircraft 322173 338011 4.9 
feig_dct 712040 738329 3.7 
6.7 Conclusion 
We introduced a new temperature-aware scheduling and resource allocation method 
that combines N different versions of scheduling and binding. The combination was 
done by rotating between the N versions and by running each of the versions for a 
certain duration of time. Maximally constrained minimally constraining scheduling 
method was used for the efficient design and implementation of the multiple versions. 
We presented a linear programming formulation of the scheduling rotation that selects 
N out of many versions and determines the duration of each version. Evaluation of 
the method on standard benchmarks showed the low overhead of implementing the 
multiple versions in one design, and selection of the best value for N. Our experimental 
results shows that using the new method, an average of about 5% reduction in the 
peak temperature is obtained on the benchmarks in comparison with the scheduling 
and binding method where the usage of all resources are balanced. 
Algorithm 1 Generation of N'-versions of the schedules. 
Input: CDFG, N' 
Output: S~ 
Ibegin 
2 Compute Rlbr using list scheduling; 
3 Choose Rt such that Rt >= Rlbt ; 
4 Generate layout grid for Rt; 
5 Compute co-ordinates (Xt, Yt) for Rt on the grid; 
6 for k = 1: N' 
7 for each resource type t; 
8 Choose a center resource net; 
9 for each resource r E Rt; 
10 compute the priority pair (Pr, nr) 
11 time = 1; 
12 ready = operations without predecessors; 
13 while There exists an unscheduled operation; 
14 begin 
15 Schedule a maximum subset of ready 
Operations with least mobility are scheduled, 
Resources with min (Pi, ni) are bound; 
16 time = time + 1; 
17 Add operations whose predecessors 
are done to ready; 
18 end 
19 end 
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Algorithm 2 The linear program to generate the rotational schedule. 
Input: grid, N'-versions 
Output: Sr 
1 Objective function 
min Tmax; 
2 Constraint type 1 
for each resource ri,j on grid 
Satisfy equation 6.1; 
3 Constraint type 2 
for each resource ri,j on grid 
Qi,j = PIP1,i,j + P2P2,i,j + ... + PNPNI,i,j; 
4 Constraint type 3 
for each resource ri,j on grid 
Ti,j <= Tmax; 
5 Constraint type 4 
PI + P2 + ... + PN = 1; 
113 
114 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
In this thesis we have presented the N-variant hardware design methodology. The 
methodology works by embedding multiple variants of parts of the same design in 
one IC. The variants are designed to add diversity and flexibility to the otherwise 
inflexible ASIC. The variants are generated using two different methods: state space 
and scheduling diversity. Both methods manipulate the control part of the design. 
The techniques take advantage of the low overhead of the control circuit of modern 
designs and thus provide diversity while incuring low area and power overheads by 
manipulating just the control parts. They can be easily integrated in the current tool 
flow. Moreover, all the transformations presented can be implemented automatically 
with minimal input from the designer, while fabrication of the resulting designs is 
identical to the fabrication of standard ASICs. Thus, these techniques are both 
inexpensive and easy to implement and do not require a high learning curve to use. 
These properties make them extremely practical. In what follows, we summarize our 
contributions and then we present possible future directions for research in this area. 
7.1 Contributions 
The contributions can be summarized as follows: 
• N-variant hardware design methodology : We introduced the idea of N-
variant hardware design and presented different ways of implementing it. The 
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practicality and usefulness of the methodology was highlighted by illustrat-
ing different applications of the method. Proof-of-concept implementations on 
standard benchmarks showed the method to be not only easy to implement 
and integrate in the ASIC design flow, but also indicated low overhead of the 
method in terms of area, power, and delay . 
• Active hardware metering for Ie protection: We presented the first active 
hardware metering method for IC protection. The method adjusts the asym-
metry in the relationship between the IC designer and the fabrication facility 
by giving the designer control over her chips once fabricated. Taking advantage 
of manufacturing variability, each IC is uniquely locked and only the designer 
can compute the key to unlock it. In this application, state space diversity 
was implemented by adding exponentially many states and generating variants 
with different starting states on the state transition graph of the design. The 
overhead of the design was estimated on standard benchmarks and was shown 
to be low in terms of area, power, and delay. 
• Active hardware metering for IP protection: In this application, we pre-
sented a hierarchical organization that takes advantage of the N-variant method-
ology to protect not only the IC design owner, but also the IP owners whose 
IPs are reused by the IC designer. Thus, the method facilitates design reuse 
of hardware IPs. In this application state space diversity was implemented by 
replicating a few states and transitions of the design FSM. Each variant used 
a different subset of the states and transitions. Implementation on standard 
benchmarks showed the method to have low overhead. We also discussed the 
security of the method in terms of attacks and countermeasures. 
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• Temperature control using N-variant Design: This application used schedul-
ing diversity to implement different variants of the controller. Rotation between 
different variants was used to control the peak temperature of the Ie. Simu-
lations showed that we could tune the peak temperature and reduce it using 
the rotational schedule. In addition, estimates of the area, power, and delay 
overheads on standard benchmarks are shown to be low. 
7.2 Future Directions 
• Applications: The applications of the N-variant hardware design methodology 
are endless. N-variant designs could be used for power tuning, post-silicon 
optimization, and fault tolerance. In addition, practical implementation of the 
method on real applications instead of standard benchmarks is important to 
validate the method. 
• Methods for adding diversity: More methods for adding diversity should 
be explored. At a low level, a new diversity dimension could use different types 
of gates for different variants, while at a high level different algorithms can be 
explored to implement different variants. 
• Software: All the methods dealt only with hardware. However, it would be 
interesting to study the applicability of these methods on software or a combi-
nation of hardware/software. 
• Variant control: All the applications presented used a static hardware-based 
method for variant control. However, varying the mechanism for controlling the 
variants may open up the scope for more interesting applications. For instance, 
variants could be controlled by software, or dynamically using feedback from 
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sensors. This should enable new methods for the adaptive control and tuning 
of computer systems. 
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